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ABSTRACT
Prior empirical analyses on federal education tax credits have concentrated on the
individual and institutional unit of analysis. These outcomes indicate mostly null effects on
promoting college enrollments, along with distribution to higher incomes, and mixed results on
tuition and fee increases. This analysis utilized institutional and state unit of analysis over a
longer timeframe, Tax Year 2001 to Tax Year 2016, using difference-in-differences estimation to
analyze the effects of education tax credits. The results indicated states have decreased
appropriations to public, two-year institutions (charging less than $4,000) 14% less than their
higher-priced counterparts, while states provided more appropriations to public, four-year
institutions (charging less than $4,000) than their higher-priced counterparts by 8.9%.
Furthermore, low-priced institutions, regardless of sector, increased tuition and fees more so than
their high-priced counterparts after the introduction of the generous American Opportunity Tax
Credit (AOTC). Low-priced, private institutions increased tuition and fees 10% more than their
high-priced counterparts. Low-priced, two-year, public institutions raised tuition and fees 17%
more than high-priced equivalents, and low-priced, four-year, public institutions raised tuition
and fees 16.6% more than high-priced equivalents.
Finally, this analysis provided new insights into state budgeting by estimating the effects
of state aid generosity on total education tax credits received per state, concentrating on the
interaction between tax-free scholarships and education tax credits. Utilizing the same
difference-in-differences estimation over the same timeframe, high-aid states (providing more
than $195 million in aid annually) received less education tax credits than low-aid states before
the policy shock, yet received exorbitantly more after the introduction of the AOTC. High-aid
states received 1,067% more than low-aid states after the introduction of the AOTC. The analysis
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also estimated models with and without states with comprehensive aid programs, and the
outcomes remain just as large and significant.
These results add to the literature on education tax credits for postsecondary education by
providing validation analyses on prior, groundbreaking research and by identifying the true
effect of state aid programs on education tax credit receipts. These results should identify a path
forward for state budgeting and the possibility of federal-state partnerships for fiscal efficiency.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most prominent issues that the higher education community encounters
revolve around funding issues. For the past decade, states have continued their dependency on
federal funding to sustain postsecondary institutions, yet state funding has not bounced back to
pre-recession levels. State funding for public institutions has decreased by $4 billion since FY
2008 (after adjusting for inflation), and state appropriations per student is $1,000 less than pre2008 levels and $2,000 less than pre-2001 levels (State Higher Education Executive Officers
[SHEEO], 2019). Likewise, for every $1,000 states cut from higher education budgets,
universities recoup that lost revenue with approximately $257 more in tuition and fees (Webber,
2017). As states continue disinvestment in discretionary spending categories such as higher
education, the reliance on federal dollars has increased, with federal support now almost twice
the amount of state fiscal support for higher education (CollegeBoard, 2019b; Grapevine, 2019).
While state economies continue at subdued levels, legislators have escalated demands on
non-discretionary spending categories such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Higher
education is then often used as a “balance wheel” in state budgets, rotating back and forth,
dependent on economic circumstance. In good economic times, higher education institutions are
relatively well appropriated. During bad economic times, they are the first to experience
cutbacks (Bound, Braga, Khanna, & Turner, 2019; Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Hovey, 1999).
Long-term budgeting is thus restricted for institutions of higher education, which affects
investment and planning decisions. The overall justification for disinvestment stems from the
harmful discourse originating from legislators and the media. This discourse insinuates that
institutions can pay for themselves with increased tuition - that they have alternative revenue
streams - a caveat that no other category in the budget is afforded (Delaney & Doyle, 2011).
1

Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forms the basis for federalism and
divided governance, granting state governments authority over reserved powers not expressly
provided to the federal government. Due to lack of explicit mention of education in the
Constitution regarding enumerated powers of the federal government, states routinely consider
education (K-12 and higher education) as a reserved, state power (U.S. Const. amend X) 1. Yet
over time, states have relinquished their duty to provide for higher education stability even as
legislators call for increased credentialing of the workforce to encourage state economic growth
(Jaschik, 2018; Smith, 2018).
Statement of the Problem
This disinvestment in a supposed state obligation raises the question of whether fiscal
authority should be centralized within state governments as this may not actually be the best
arrangement for the current state of higher education and for economic development. Perhaps a
more collaborative fiscal endeavor between the federal and state governments would be
conducive to advancing higher education affordability and access. The federal government may
be more adept at redistributing income since its tax system is more progressive than state tax
systems — increasing tax liability as income accrues. With the introduction of partial
refundability of one of the most generous education tax credits, the American Opportunity Tax
Credit, the federal government began redistributing aid to lower-income families. Previously,
this income level received no such benefits. Furthermore, citizens are mobile and may choose to

1

Each state’s constitution, aside from the Washington D.C municipality, stipulates the formulation of a
public school system. Some state constitutions expressly mention the creation of institutions of higher
education; however, it is not universal. States have implied powers over education as a consequence of
the ruling in the San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) case, in which the
Supreme Court reached a majority opinion that there is no universal right of education mentioned in the
U.S. Constitution.
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move to states with lower taxes, which can cause states to cut taxes as low as possible to retain
residents (Oates, 1999; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). The Tax Foundation (2019) identified five
states (New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Iowa, and Ohio) with the heaviest tax climates were
also the top five with the most outbound migration. This “race to the bottom” thus affects state
financial assistance programs and lessens opportunity for those most in need (McPherson &
Baum, 2017).
Nationally, state appropriations for higher education have remained relatively flat from
Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 to FY 2018 — a few states have increased state appropriations while
others have decreased such support. Yet, most of this aid is progressively going towards meritbased grants (National Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs [NASSGAP], 2020),
aid that has been causally related to windfall payments to upper-income households (Cornwell &
Mustard, 2007; Dynarski, 2000). Currently, 28 states have some form of purely merit-based
grant (NASSGAP, 2020). However, there is reason to believe that states with broad-based
financial aid programs lose out on federal funding due to the tax-free nature of these programs.
Taxpayers cannot receive a tax credit for qualified expenses if those qualified expenses are paid
for by a tax-free grant or scholarship (IRS, 2020). Therefore, if a student receives a state grant or
scholarship that covers tuition and fees, the taxpayer receives less federal funding in the form of
tax credits; veritably costing states much-needed, alternative sources of funding.
Purpose and Significance of the Study
The purpose of this study is to update the literature on education tax credits and to
identify the effect of the interaction between federal education tax credits and largescale state aid
programs on state budgets. This is a crucial step in investigating sustainable state budgeting
mechanisms to ensure college affordability and access for all. Because of this interaction, it is
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likely that states with such broad-based aid — of which many are simultaneously facing funding
limitations - are losing valuable federal dollars. The results of this analysis will identify whether
it is in the states’ best interests to modify grant aid programs to increase tax credit receipts.
Because states function in silos, oftentimes at odds with federal policy, it is essential to eradicate
or remedy state policies that act in discordance with federal policy or vice versa, whichever leads
to fiscal efficiency. If studies routinely confirm that merit-based financial aid programs are
windfalls to certain income levels - providing additional income to students who would have
enrolled regardless of the subsidy - states could cap funding to lower income levels. They could
also make aid programs progressive (with less aid to wealthier families) or switch to purely
need-based aid. To avoid political fallout and reprehension from the voting public,
communication regarding education tax credits could be a salve for less liquidity-constrained
individuals, who can afford to be reimbursed after enrolling and paying for college.
Overview of Theoretical Frameworks
Several theoretical perspectives guide this analysis as the research hinges on philosophy,
economics, psychology, and finance. The framework for the justification of education tax credits
falls somewhere within the intersections of rational choice, market failure, and human capital
theories. Yet, the research questions ask whether states or institutions react to education tax
credits, which may bring plausibility to much-debated theories of cooperative federalism and the
flypaper effect.
A rational human being will always seek to maximize self-interests above all else; every
personal choice reflects this conscious balancing act of costs and benefits for maximum utility
(Smith, 1759/2011). However, every individual encounters constraints in the form of time and
capital in the pursuit of self-interest maximization (Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 2008).
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Furthermore, education produces positive externalities, outputs that benefit not just the
individual pursuing such education but also society. In the higher education market demand
curve, the marginal social benefit will always be higher than the marginal private benefit. As
rational actors seek to maximize self-interests, they will always undervalue the true price of
education, only considering the marginal private benefits. In a competitive economic market
system, this constant undervaluing leads to market failure.
Correspondingly, an advanced economy’s skill premium gap and its resulting income
inequality is thought to be caused by the lag in the supply of educated labor (human capital)
compared to the demand for skills (Mill 1865/2017; Smith, 1776/2012; Tinbergen, 1974). As the
knowledge-based economy has replaced prior workforce paradigms, advanced education and
skill training are necessary tools for workforce competition (Callan, 2011). The knowledgebased economy necessitates maximum productivity and the acquisition of “knowledge workers”workers skilled in theoretical and analytical thinking rather than just experiential practice
(Drucker, 2011). Consequently, labor-intensive tasks in this economic environment - often
performed by unskilled workers - are considered less valuable. Therefore, if a nation seeks to
maintain or grow economic prosperity, it must elicit an increased stockpile of human capital
necessary for work optimization and for localized wealth (Drucker, 2011). A nation’s education
system is the single most important producer of human capital necessary for an advanced
economy (Autor, 2014; Drucker, 2011).
Although this study explains the rationale behind education tax credits and their mass
appeal utilizing the abovementioned theoretical frameworks, the research questions to follow
address the effects of education tax credits on state budgets — a different focal point. This
requires additional theoretical considerations in which to guide the research. These additional

5

theories include the plausibility of intergovernmental grants on public program success and
increasing federal bounds on certain state-owned obligations. The flypaper effect refers to the
potency of intergovernmental fund transfers on state or municipality public spending, more so
than an increase in direct citizen income. Based on more than fifty years of research, there is still
much debate on this topic, with empirical support from both proponents and opponents (Craig
and Inman, 1982; Gramlich, 1969; Henderson, 1968; Hines and Thaler, 1995).
If federal fund transfers to state governments increase state public spending more so than
without such transfers, then there may be incentives to pursuing a more cooperative federalist
agenda more fervently. Cooperative federalism refers to the expansive reach of the federal
government within state government policymaking and budgeting, akin to the New Deal policies
prescribed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt after the Great Depression. Within cooperative
federalism, the national, state, and local governments work together to solve mutual problems as
opposed to the isolated decision-making in dual federalism or “states’ rights” federalism. Such
siloed decision-making oftentimes leads to ineffectual, duplicative, or counterintuitive
policymaking. However, states must also maintain certain levels of autonomy; therefore, the
cooperative federalism referred in this study alludes to Hills’ (1998) functional theory of
cooperative federalism. In this form of cooperative federalism, states can voluntarily accept
conditional grants-in-aid (funding that has conditions on use) from the federal government as
opposed to the federal government commandeering services of state or local agents. Through the
design of the particular grant, federal-state governments can truly be cooperative and
collaborative as intended by the forefathers of this nation.

6

Research Questions
In an effort to identify federal-state policy efficiency and formulate best practices in state
budgeting for higher education, I pose three questions.
Q1: How are education tax credits distributed across states and various income levels?
Q2: Has the growth in education tax credit funding caused an increase in tuition and fees,
and have state appropriations decreased as a result of tax credit generosity?
Q3: How do federal tax credits interact with states with large financial aid programs?
Tax Policy Key Terms
In the study of tax policy, it is customary to see key terms that are not universally known
or are commonly misinterpreted. To provide clarity and consistency, the following terms have
been defined:
Tax expenditures. As defined by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of
1974, tax expenditures are “those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability” (2 U.S.C. § 622).
Tax expenditures are subsidies in the same vein as grant funding. They are a form of federal
spending; however, grant funding is allocated during the annual budget process whereas tax
expenditures are estimated and considered revenue lost (Hungerford, 2008).
Tax credits. Tax credits decrease the amount of money taxpayers owe to the federal
government (liability), decreasing dollar for dollar one’s tax liability (IRS, 2020). Tax credits can
be nonrefundable or refundable.
Tax deductions. Before a taxpayer’s tax liability is determined annually, tax deductions
are subtracted until liability equals $0. Deductions do not decrease one’s tax liability dollar for
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dollar, rather they are subtracted from gross income, resulting in less income subject to tax. Tax
credits that are nonrefundable do not provide tax refunds if tax liability drops below $0.
However, when a tax credit is refundable, the federal government is required to provide payment
to taxpayers when annual tax payments are greater than their total tax liability (IRS, 2020).
Tax Year (TY). A tax year for individual income tax returns refers to the calendar year
(January 1 to December 31) in which income taxes are withheld. When taxes are prepared and
filed, the tax year is the prior year. For example, all income taxes withheld for TY 2019 occurs
between January 1 and December 31, 2019, and the return is filed the following year by April
2020 (IRS, 2020). Tax credits are awarded after the tax year, during the year filed.
Fiscal Year (FY). Accounting for federal appropriations occurs between October 1 and
September 30 of the following year. For example, FY 2019 begins on October 1, 2018 and ends
on September 30, 2019 (U.S. Senate, 2020). Appropriation bills are passed before the beginning
of a fiscal year.
Tax-based aid. Any tax credit, deduction, and saving plan that helps American taxpayers
pay for expenses related to higher education is considered tax-based aid. However, unless
otherwise stated, this article refers to the main education tax credit programs, the Hope Tax
Credit, the Lifetime Learning Tax Credit, and the American Opportunity Tax Credit. This federal
aid is determined by income, which has expanded to include both lower and upper-income
households.
Income level classifications. Income level classifications are defined by the Pew
Research Center as there is no federal definition for low, middle, and upper-class income levels.
Middle-income households are defined as “those with an income that is 67% to 200% of the
overall median household income, after incomes have been adjusted for household size” (Pew
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Research Center, 2015, para. 10). Median household income is provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau every year, and stands at $61,937 (Guzman, 2019). Therefore, middle-income
households range from $41,498 to $123,874, dependent on household size. Lower-income
households fall below two-thirds of the median household income, and upper-income households
make more than double the median household income.
Table 1. Parameters of Education Tax Credit Programs
Hope Tax Credit
Lifetime Learning
(HTC)
Tax Credit (LLTC)
Phased Out in
2008
$1,800
$2,000
Maximum
Amount

American
Opportunity Tax
Credit (AOTC)
Implemented in 2009
$2,500

100% of the first
$1,200 in QE and
50% of the
subsequent $1,200
in QE

20% of up to $10,000
in QE

100% of the first
$2,000 in QE and 25%
of the subsequent
$2,000 in QE

Income
Threshold

$48,000-$58,000
(single filers)
$96,000-$116,000
(married filers)

$57,000-$67,000a
(single filers)
$114,000-$134,000a
(married filers)

$80,000-$90,000
(single filers)
$160,000-$180,000
(married filers)

Refundable

Nonrefundable

Nonrefundable

40% refundable; max.
$1,000

Term Limit

First two years of
college

Unlimited; as long as
enrolled

First four years of
college

Enrollment
Requirement

Enrolled half-time

Enrolled in at least
one course

Enrolled half-time

Qualified
Expenses (QE)

Tuition and fees

Tuition and fees

Tuition, fees,
textbooks, course
materials

Funding
Formula

a

The Lifetime Learning Tax Credit income thresholds are adjusted for inflation each year. The American
Opportunity Tax Credit is not.
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Overview of Methodology
Prior studies have analyzed the first two research questions. However, there is
considerable difference in the outcomes of my proposed research. First, I will be utilizing a
different unit of analysis than in prior studies. Whereas Long (2004), Turner (2011), LaLumia
(2012), and Bulman and Hoxby (2015) concentrated on individual actions based on potential and
actual tax filer variables, this study will analyze publicly-available aggregate national and statelevel data to determine area-specific action. Furthermore, the timing of this study and the data
available provide increased statistical power over the others. State-level tax data is available for
TY 1996 through TY 2017, providing almost twenty years of data post-HTC/LLTC
implementation and almost ten years of data post-AOTC implementation.
In addition, this study will take a deeper look into Long’s (2004) analysis of education
tax credit effects on states with large financial aid programs, utilizing an econometric,
difference-in-differences design. States vary in the amount of federal education tax savings
received every year. Several factors cause this variation that affect inputs in the tax credit
formula. These factors include: the income levels of students and families within a state, the
distribution of low- and high-priced institutions within a state, the amount of state citizens that
file federal income tax returns, the number of state citizens enrolled in postsecondary
institutions, and the amount of state financial aid provided (Conklin, 1998). These factors will be
included as control variables within the analysis.
Although Long’s (2004) study identified both substantial tuition increases for public,
two-year and four-year institutions and increased state appropriations to four-year institutions in
states with large financial aid programs as a result of education tax credits, there is yet to be any
empirical research done on the effects of federal education tax credits on state budgets. This is
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important for both state and institutional budgeting as twenty-eight states now possess expansive
and expensive merit-aid programs, which are draining state coffers and becoming unsustainable.
There is urgent need for evidence instead of conjecture of potential loss of federal funds due to
generous state aid policies — which could be a sign of the misalignment of state and federal
policy.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Even though few studies have empirically examined the impact of tax-based aid on
college enrollment or other measures of college success, no study has analyzed the effects of
education tax credits on state budgeting. In the absence of such studies, one must first fully
understand the underlying theoretical assumptions that guide human behaviors towards college
enrollment as well as the primary, empirical studies that have evaluated such behaviors to
structure a meaningful and impactful study for the remediation of current tax policy. In this quest
for guidance and structure, the following sections will provide an overview of the literature on
financial aid and college enrollment and the trend favoring merit-based aid programs in states.
This will be followed by sections on theoretical assumptions that give credence to tax credit
origins; an introduction to federal tax-based assistance and an analysis of the most prominent
education tax credit programs promulgated via the Internal Revenue Code; a review of empirical
research that relates back to the research questions posed in this study, and a plan to build upon
such research using theories that relate to effectual state budgeting for higher education.
Correlation between Financial Aid and College Enrollment
States vary by how successful they are at encouraging college enrollment. In 2016,
Colorado had the highest percentage of adults over the age of 25 with a bachelor’s degree at
24.9%, and West Virginia had the lowest percentage at 12.6%. The national average was 19.3%
(The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018). States, because of their semi-defined rights of
reserved powers, create disparate aid policies to encourage increases in skilled labor and
subsequent state economic prosperity. Several studies have shown the positive effects of grant
aid on college enrollment (Abraham & Clark, 2006; Alon, 2011; Andrews, DesJardins, &
Ranchhod, 2010; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2000, 2003, 2004; Kane, 1995,
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2003). The reasons that subsidies in the form of grants encourage greater college enrollment are
due to the fact that they lower tuition costs for financially constrained students (Dynarski, 2000),
allow students to travel farther to better or more applicable institutions (Andrews, Desjardins, &
Ranchhod, 2010; Bettinger, Gurantz, Kawano, & Sacerdote, 2016;), and reduce the need to work
during college, thus allocating more time for studying (Chen & DesJardins, 2010).
Student price response is therefore a measure of the relationship between the price of the
attending college and the quantity demanded - or the decision to enroll. This measure is also
known as price elasticity of demand - or “the percentage change in quantity divided by the
percentage change in the price of the good or service” (Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 2016, p. 177).
If the quantity demanded decreases due to an increase in price, the student is then elastic, and
thus, less likely to enroll in college. Alternatively, if the quantity demanded increases as price
increases, the student is then inelastic and unfazed to price differentials (Dorman, 2013). Certain
factors also affect student price response such as the desire to enroll in college, the amount of
income or capital available to fund the endeavor, expectations of future earnings and the yield
from pursuing a college education, and the costs (tangible and intangible) of other goods or
services (Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 2016).
Leslie and Brinkman (1987) identified all relevant studies at the time that dealt with
student price response and college enrollment, summarily noting that for every $1000 (in 198283 dollars) added to tuition, enrollment declined by 6-8% percentage points. Heller (1997)
updated this research and concluded that student price response remained consistent with Leslie
and Brinkman’s (1987) analysis, notably that for every $1000 (in 1996 dollars) increase in
tuition, enrollment declined by five to ten percentage points. Further studies have confirmed the
highly elastic nature of the student population and how enrollment will positively correspond
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with lower tuition. Dynarski (2000) stated that for every $1,000 (in 2000 dollars) of subsidy
provided to a student, the college attendance rates for middle- and upper-income students rise by
four to six percentage points. Castleman and Long’s (2016) results indicated that an additional
$1,000 (in 2000 dollars) in needs-based grant aid in Florida increased enrollment by 2.5
percentage points at public institutions. Abraham and Clark (2006) also indicated a rise of more
than 150% in college enrollments at DC Tuition Assistance Grant-eligible institutions between
1998 and 2000, with a 3.6 percentage point increase in enrollment per $1000 (in 2000 dollars) in
aid offered.
Although all evidence points to increased aid as a powerful stimulus for enrollment,
states are increasingly preferring to funnel aid towards merit-based programs (Dynarski, 2004;
Heller, 2002). Since the passage of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship program in 1993 - an
expansive state merit-based program, several states have followed suit. Figure 1 shows this
positive trend since 1993-1994. These merit-aid programs are popular to the voting public and
are sound in practice, citing justifications of increasing college access, providing enrollment
incentives, and attracting and maintaining the best students in the state (Ness, 2007). Further
analysis of these programs shows a more nuanced and exclusionary outcome. Moreover, as needbased grants continue to increase nationally, this growth is largely due to just eight states’
philanthropic efforts: California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois,
Washington, and Virginia, which account for 70% of the total proportion of national need-based
aid (NASSGAP, 2017).
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Figure 1. National undergraduate need-based aid and merit-based aid from 1990 to 2016. Adapted from
“Grant Aid 1990 to 2016,” NASSGAP, 2020. Copyright 2020 by NASSGAP.

Merit-aid Effect on Enrollment and Persistence
Enrollment effects for many of the largest merit-based programs are positive, yet the
amount of increase is minimal for such massive investments. Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar
(2006) identified a 5.9% increase in enrollment for Georgia’s colleges from 1988-1997 due to
the inception of the HOPE scholarship program. However, this 5.9% increase only accounts for
15% of the total freshmen applicants during that time period. Several studies have corroborated
this similar finding regarding the HOPE program, the most researched aid program in the nation.
Dynarski (2000) found an increase of 7-8% from 1989-1997, and in a later study (2003)
comparing seven other Southern states from 1993-2000, she identified a range more akin to 57% in Georgia. Zhang, Hu, and Sensenig (2013) found a much larger effect when comparing the
Florida Bright Futures program, with an increase in public, four-year enrollment by 22.3%. Of
note, they did consider the lower eligibility requirements of the aid program for this substantive
increase.
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Merit-aid programs also tend to encourage higher academic outcomes. Scott-Clayton
(2011) found the West Virginia PROMISE program, which connects academic achievement to
program eligibility, increased students’ cumulative GPAs, amount of total credits earned in the
first year, and completion rates. Zhang (2011) supported this analysis by analyzing both the
HOPE and Bright Futures scholarship programs in Georgia and Florida, respectively, and
concluded that the programs increased graduation rates in STEM fields by 5-13%. Furthermore,
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2013) cumulatively reviewed all applicable merit-aid programs and
identified overall increased persistence and completion rates, especially among low-income,
minority populations. Regarding state economic prosperity, Zhang and Ness (2010) identified
state merit-aid programs as critical in preventing resident students from migrating to other states,
thus reducing brain drain.
Merit-aid Effects on Income Level
Although there has been much research on the impact of subsidies on low-income
families (Dynarski, 2003; Kane, 1995; St. John, Daun-Barnett, & Moronski-Chapman, 2013),
very little has been done to determine the impact of subsidies on middle- and upper-income
families. Dynarski (2000) clearly stated that “history has provided few experiments that would
allow us to measure the responsiveness to aid of middle- and upper-income youth” (p. 630). As
most state policies are focusing more on merit-based programs instead of need-based programs,
it is worth noting that a substantial amount of aid goes to upper-income students (Dynarski,
2000, 2003, 2004; Perna, 2006). Studies have shown that variables that affect college-going
behavior and aid eligibility include high school academic performance, access to information
about college and financial aid, the level of financial assets, and number of siblings. Middle- and
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upper-income families tend to have the social capital necessary to acquire high levels of these
variables (Dynarski, 2003; Perna, 2006).
This increase towards higher income recipients is evident in Perna’s (2006) study, where
she revealed institutional grant aid based on merit increased from 19% in 1992 to 27% in 1999
for low-income students and from 37% in 1992 to 49% in 1999 for upper-income students. In
similar fashion, Stewart (2013) identified more than half of New Mexico’s lottery scholarship
recipients, awarded on merit, came from families with income above $100,000, while 30% came
from families with annual incomes of $20,000 to $39,999. Dynarski (2000) additionally stated
that Georgia’s HOPE scholarship program increased the gap in college attendance rates between
Blacks and Whites and between upper- and lower-income youth more so than in the southeastern
region compared in the study. Since 2008-09, Louisiana families with incomes above $150,000
have increased their share of Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (TOPS) awards by 56%,
whereas the recipients from the lowest households ($0-$14,999) have only increased by
approximately 17% (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2019).
Theory behind Federal Financial Assistance for Higher Education
The following theoretical frameworks conceptualize the creation of financial assistance
for higher education. As more citizens realize the ramifications of a postsecondary credential and
employers consistently demand upskilled workers, the demand for training and education
increases. However, economies cannot prosper if a significant portion of the population is barred,
due to economic constraints, from attaining such credentials. In fact, if a large proportion of the
population cannot afford to gain this credential, the states, through increased taxation, must
alleviate the resultant poverty that this creates. This causes states to spend vast expenditures on
remediating the effects of poverty instead of reaping the benefits of economic growth.
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Rational choice theory and effects of cost-benefit analysis. A key factor in economic
modeling is that individuals are rational actors, seeking to maximize self-interests. A rational
actor weighs the costs and benefits of a possible scenario, choosing the option that affords the
most expected utility, or satisfaction. In this case a rational actor weighs the costs of attendance
and foregone earnings - earnings lost due to time in college - on the benefits of future, higher
salaries (Paulsen, 2001). Several studies address how a rational actor internalizes the costs and
benefits of college enrollment, which oftentimes is based on an individual’s interpretation of
future returns on investment. Returns can be in the form of short-term or long-term earning
differentials between high school and college graduates (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; Linsenmeier,
Rosen, & Rouse, 2006; Paulsen, 2001). Lower direct institutional costs or higher subsidies (or a
combination of both) also induce higher demand.
However, rationality in the economic sense does not always look the same as the societal
consensus of rationality. David Hume, a contemporary of and great influence to Adam Smith the father of economics, theorized that all humans were guided by their emotions, that reason is
“the slave of the passions” encapsulated by ideas of pleasure and pain (Hume, 1739/1986).
Therefore, in the psychological framework that guides traditional economics and rational choice
modeling, goals are motivated by emotions or “passions”, reason provides the mechanism to
attain these goals, and rational decision-making follows choices that effectively lead to satisfying
these emotions. In this framework, rationality can be viewed as irrational in the societal sense,
i.e., self-sacrifice or self-harm; however, in the economic sense, this decision-making follows
rational, self-interested thinking. What can cause irrational rationality in college-going decisionmaking? Lack of information or misinformation about college costs, inability or unwillingness
to take out loans, ingrained societal or cultural dispositions, and other cognitive biases play a role

18

in shaping an individual’s decision-making process towards college enrollment (Baum &
Schwartz, 2015; Perna, 2006, 2008).
When a rational actor begins the decision-making process, the individual performs a
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis. Regarding higher education and the intent to enroll, a student
will analyze estimated costs - foregone earnings from unemployment for four-plus years, loan
interest accrual, the total cost of attendance, possibility of loan default and low employment
outcomes. A student will simultaneously analyze estimated benefits - higher long-term earnings,
job security, supplemental benefits associated with higher paying jobs, and the ability to pay off
loans. Cost-benefit computation is relatively straightforward when items in question can be
referenced in monetary measurements. However, the costs and, particularly, the benefits of a
college education are difficult to monetize. Oftentimes, individuals may perform a cost-benefit
analysis before enrolling in an institution of higher education, but they do so with arbitrary and
abstractive measurements that may conflate or deflate the real value of the college
experience/outcome (Posner & Adler, 1999). This abstraction can then lead to the detrimental
effect of undervaluing higher education, namely market failure.
Positive externalities and market failure. A public good, in the economic sense, is one
that is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous. A good can be non-excludable if everyone can
benefit from it without restrictions. A good can be non-rivalrous if the addition of individual
users does not crowd out other users simultaneously. Although higher education is not precisely
a public good in this sense as colleges charge tuition and fees, it does provide benefits to others,
or what economists call positive externalities. Because there is some publicness to the higher
education market via its positive externalities, scholars consider the market a public good (Bator,
1958). Ma, Pender, and Welch (2016) identified such externalities as reduction in reliance on
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public assistance and healthcare costs, lower mortality rates, less poverty, increased federal and
state tax bases, and increased civic participation, to name a few.
Unfortunately, as rational actors seek to maximize their own self-interests first and
foremost, they may evade paying or unknowingly devalue the costs of these direct or indirect
externalities if at all possible. This skews the supply and demand curve for the higher education
market. The market will then underproduce the undervalued service, which is a detriment to
society. Without direct influence, self-interest strategies or cost-benefit abstractions, which are
often considered transaction costs, will blight the momentum of the “invisible hand” of the free
market.
In order to remedy effects of transaction costs in the presence of externalities,
government intervention is crucial (Friedman & Schwartz, 1986; Hobbes, 1660/1968; Pigou,
1928; Samuelson, 1954). Through the use of federal, state, or local taxing, government can
supply subsidies to education to reflect the true value of the good, restoring the supply curve to
its natural state. This then helps lower the costs of the service, which attracts rational actors, thus
restoring the demand curve. Antagonists of a market with positive externalities are the
transaction costs associated with rational decision-making. Transaction costs can create
seemingly irrational rationality as mentioned in the prior section.
Human capital theory and the knowledge-based economy. Human capital theory, a core
theory in the economics and finance of higher education, posits that the more knowledge and
skills (human capital) an individual can acquire, the more productive an individual can be. This,
in turn, increases profits for industry, grows overall economies, and leads to higher earnings
(Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1993; Smith, 1776/2012). Coincidentally, the knowledge-based economy
has mandated a need for a higher skilled labor force; therefore, the labor market itself acts as an
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indirect stimulus for post-secondary enrollment. These two themes interact — the labor force
demands higher education in order to earn a wage sufficient enough to maintain a middle-class
lifestyle, yet the costs of attaining such education are out of reach to a growing percentage of the
population (Lumina Foundation, 2015).
However, it is clear that earning a post-secondary credential accelerates one’s path to
higher earnings (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2020). Figure 2 provides data on both the
unemployment rates and median weekly earnings per educational attainment level. There is a
negative correlation between unemployment rates and earnings when measured by educational
attainment. Attaining a bachelor’s degree increases earnings above those of a high school
graduate by 64% while decreasing unemployment rates by 46%.
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2018. Adapted from “Unemployment Projections, 2018,” by Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020. Copyright
2020 by BLS.
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Due to transaction costs, individuals consume less higher education than is economically
efficient. Although the personal and societal benefits from receiving a post-secondary credential
are large, individuals routinely renege on the endeavor because tuition costs, which are relatively
easy to calibrate in a cost-benefit equation, are the only ones analyzed. This deadweight loss, or
economic inefficiency, can be remedied by government subsidies that lower the true cost of
higher education. However, government intervention should only be implemented when the
overall benefits outweigh the costs. As can be seen in the knowledge-based labor market, this
subsidization is well worth the effort. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020),
occupations that require a post-secondary credential are slated to outpace occupations that
require just a high school diploma through 2026. Growth in occupations that require a postsecondary credential is expected to grow by 10-11%, three to four percentage points above the
national average, whereas occupations requiring a high school diploma continue to lag behind
the national average by five percentage points.
Federal Financial Assistance of Higher Education
The federal government allocates funding, directly and indirectly, to state and local
governments with the intent to promote redistributive public policies related to healthcare,
education, workforce development, and other programs for societal benefit. The federal
government provides this funding (or subsidization) for goods that produce additional, positive
outputs, or externalities, to society in order to counterbalance the deflated market price
anticipated in a capitalist market (Leven & Belfield, 2003). This federal funding comes in two
forms: grants and tax expenditures. In FY 2018, the federal government distributed $697 billion
in grants and $1.5 trillion in tax expenditures to college-going individuals (Congressional
Research Service [CRS], 2019; Joint Committee on Taxation [JCT], 2018a). Although many of
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the federal grants flow directly to state and local budgets, this is not the case for higher
education, where funding (aside from research grants) flows directly to the student - a
modification made in the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1972 (Alexander,
1998). This indirect funding of higher education has led to a profusion of problems and
inefficiencies ranging from rising achievement gaps, the proliferation of predatory for-profits,
windfall payments to upper-income families, and increased competition among public and
private non-profits and for-profits, just to name a few (Alexander & Arceneaux, 2015; Dynarski,
2000, 2003, 2004; Long, 2004; Singell & Stone, 2002).
Federal aid plays a large role in keeping post-secondary institutions afloat in this era of
state disinvestment. As Figure 3 indicates, the incremental increase of federal funding over state
funding for higher education began in FY 2003 at a rate of 3.7%. This proportion spiked to 135%
in FY 2011 and fell back down to 75% in FY 2018 (CollegeBoard, 2019a; Grapevine, 2019).
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Federal Financial Assistance in the Form of Tax-based Aid
Tax expenditures and grant funding are similar forms of federal spending. However,
legislators decide on total grant funding amounts during the annual budget process; whereas, tax
expenditures are estimated without congressional adjudication or evaluation and considered
revenue lost from year to year (Hungerford, 2008). Tax credits decrease taxpayer liability, the
amount of money taxpayers owe to the federal government, decreasing dollar for dollar one’s tax
liability (IRS, 2020). Tax credits can be nonrefundable or refundable. If a tax credit is
nonrefundable, then taxpayers do not receive tax refunds if tax liability drops below $0. If a tax
credit is refundable, then the federal government is required to provide refunds when annual tax
payments are greater than total tax liability (IRS, 2020). Refundable tax credits increase the
federal budget deficit due to this monetary exchange.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 introduced the first tax credit programs for higher
education by creating the HOPE (Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally) and Lifetime
Learning tax credits. With the same intention as Georgia Governor Zell Miller’s HOPE
Scholarship (a broad-based merit-aid program with an intent to increase statewide college
attainment), President Bill Clinton established the HOPE Tax Credit (HTC). The HTC sought to
reward students who earned a “B” average in high school with financial assistance to help pay
for the first two years of community college. In its first iteration, the tax credit deducted 100% of
the first $1,000 of qualified expenses and 50% for the next $1,000. The maximum credit was
$1,500 for taxpayers with incomes below $40,000-$50,000 (single filers) and $80,000-$100,000
(married filers) to help pay for the first two years of higher education, regardless of institutional
sector (Dynarski, Scott-Clayton, & Wiederspan, 2013). Upon final approval of the proposed bill,
the Clinton Administration eliminated the grade requirement. This allowed any taxpayer, who
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fell within the income requirements, to receive the benefit if enrolled at least half-time for an
academic period beginning in the respective tax year.
By 2008, taxpayers saw an increase in the maximum credit, up to $1,800 while income
level thresholds increased to $48,000-$58,000 (single filers) or $96,000-$116,000 (married
filers), due to inflation indexation. As income grew, the maximum credit phased out. Middleclass families were the intended beneficiaries as they were ineligible for need-based federal
funding. Therefore, eligible taxpayers only received nonrefundable credits, allowing those
taxpayers with sufficient tax liability to benefit from the credit (Crandall-Hollick, 2018). The
HTC terminated in 2008, replaced by the more generous American Opportunity Tax Credit
(AOTC).
The Lifetime Learning Tax Credit (LLTC) allows taxpayers more opportunities for tax
savings, including the inclusion of students who enroll less than half-time or in a certificate
program or enter college mid-career. With the same income qualifications as the HTC (indexed
for inflation), the LLTC allows eligible taxpayers to claim 20% of up to $5,000 in qualified
expenses, for a maximum credit of $1,000 per return, which by 2003 had increased to a
maximum credit of $2,000 and up to $10,000 in qualified expenses, as prescribed in the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The LLTC, like the HTC, is nonrefundable but is less stringent,
requiring a student enroll in at least one course per applicable tax year. Unlike the HTC, the
LLTC is still a viable tax credit option for taxpayers. Notably, the HTC and LLTC only cover
tuition expenses and required fees. Room and board and other living expenses are not considered
qualified expenses.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 established the
American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC) temporarily for Tax Years 2009 and 2010, replacing
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and improving the HTC by expanding eligibility to a wider spectrum of income levels.
Additional programmatic enhancements included an increase in the maximum credit and partial
refundability if tax liability falls below $0. The maximum value increased from $1,800 to $2,500
per return but, unlike the HTC, does not adjust for inflation. Legislative authors increased the
maximum credit by 28% on account of trending state disinvestment and college tuition increases,
which rose at a rate higher than inflation. This was intentionally designed to restore the value of
previous tax credit programs (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2010).
Taxpayers with incomes that fall below $80,000-90,000 (single filers) or $160,000$180,000 (married filers) are eligible for the AOTC and credits diminish as income reaches these
income thresholds. The AOTC requires half-time enrollment, but instead of the two-year time
limit of the HTC, it can be claimed for the first four years of post-secondary education. An
important factor in this program is that up to 40% ($1,000) can be refunded to taxpayers with
little or no tax liability, which provides the opportunity for more populations to reap the benefits
(IRS, 2020). Qualified expenses for the AOTC include tuition and required fees, but unlike the
HTC or LLTC, it also includes textbook and required course material costs.
The expanded and generous tax savings provided by the temporary AOTC increased tax
expenditures by over 90%, to more than $18.2 billion, in 2009 alone. During the same year,
approximately 400,000 additional taxpayers received an average tax credit of $1,700, an increase
of 75% more than the average HTC or LLTC (Crandall-Hollick, 2018; U.S. Department of
Treasury, 2010). With the addition of partial refundability, 4.5 million taxpayers received on
average $800 in federal pay-outs in 2009, totaling $3.6 billion in federal foregone revenue (U.S.
Department of Treasury, 2010). President Barack Obama intended the AOTC to provide four
years of potential tax savings; therefore, he extended the AOTC for an additional two years,
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packaging the extension along with a slew of other temporary tax extenders under the Tax Relief,
Unemployment Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. As the tax savings proved
spectacularly popular, it was extended once again through the American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012 for an additional five years (Crandall-Hollick, 2018). In 2015, the tax credit program
became a permanent fixture in the Internal Revenue Code with the passing of the Protecting
Americans from Tax Hikes Act, allowing American taxpayers to reap the benefits henceforward.
Today, the two education tax credits (HOPE is replaced by the more generous AOTC) are
the costliest education tax savings allotted to taxpayers, draining federal revenues by $18.3
billion for FY 2019 (JCT, 2019). This increase is in part due to the exclusion of tax expenditures
from annual appropriations oversight and their availability to all applicable taxpayers. The
AOTC and the Lifetime Learning Tax Credits are always bundled together in federal databases
(IRS SOI, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; JCT, 2018a); therefore, when referring to the AOTC for the rest
of this essay, the term will refer to both tax credit programs.
With the AOTC’s expansion of eligibility in 2009, along with the refundable portion of
the program, total federal spending on tax-based aid has increased dramatically. As Figure 4
shows, from TY 1998 to TY 2008, education tax credits claimed remained stable, holding steady
from $5 to $8 billion. However, upon AOTC implementation in TY 2009, credits claimed
skyrocketed to $21.1 billion. They then peaked at $26 billion in TY 2011 and have continued to
hover between $18-19 billion henceforth. The Joint Committee on Estimation (JCT, 2018a)
expects the education tax credits to remain at this level for the next year; however, this may
change with tax simplification and better communication strategies. Turner (2011) identified
almost 37% of the population of eligible taxpayers failed to apply for an education tax credit in
TY 2010.
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Total Education Tax Credits Claimed in Billions of Dollars (in real 2017 dollars)
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Figure 4. Total education tax credits claimed in billions of dollars from TY1998-2018. Adapted from
“IRS SOI, TY1998-2016 from Table 3.3,” by IRS, 2020a and “Estimated Budgetary Impacts for FY 2017
and 2018,” by JCT, 2018a. Copyright 2020 by IRS and 2018 by JCT.

Interaction of Education Tax Credits and Other Financial Assistance
According to the IRS instructions for tax benefits for education, Publication 970, a
taxpayer, who receives a tax-free scholarship or grant (federal or state) must subtract the amount
used for qualified education expenses such as tuition and required fees before determining the
tax credit amount (IRS, 2020). If the entire amount of qualified education expenses is paid by the
scholarship or grant, then a taxpayer cannot claim the credits. However, if the taxpayer
intentionally includes the scholarship or grant in their gross income, then the tax-free nature of
the scholarship is removed. The taxpayer can then receive a tax credit. This act requires tax
know-how and prior calculation of whether this will decrease or increase tax liability, which
many taxpayers lack or fail to do. Therefore, there is reason to believe that states with large
financial aid programs (need-based or merit-based) lose out on federal funding because of this
caveat.
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Empirical Research Related to Tax-based Aid Effects on Enrollment
Intuitively, an increase in disposable income that can help offset the costs of college
should increase college enrollment as studies on federal grant aid often indicate; however, the
rare studies available on tax-based aid indicate mostly null effects on college enrollment
(Bulman & Hoxby, 2015; Crandall-Hollick, 2018; LaLumia, 2012; Long, 2004; Turner, 2011).
Hoblitzell & Smith (2001) were trailblazers in this field, performing a case study on the
University of California System to identify the enrollment effects of the HTC and LLTC in 1999,
one year after implementation. They found that of the $79.6 million in tax savings for the entire
system, the majority (46%) of undergraduates whose parents fell in the $60,000 to $79,999
income range used the credits to their advantage. Conclusively, their study identified a strong,
positive effect on college enrollment, granting students, on average, between $661 and $1,119 a
year (Hoblitzell & Smith, 2001). Although the survey results from their study were strong, with
9,000 respondents, the case study sample is not generalizable nor representative of the broader
populations within the nation.
Long (2004) was the first to empirically study the effects of tax credits from a national
perspective. She used publicly available IRS aggregate tax return data from 1998 to 2000 and the
1999-2000 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS) to identify descriptive statistics
on the distribution of tax credits. She reported 43% of undergraduate students and over half of
graduate students at predominantly four-year colleges and proprietary schools were eligible for
some amount of either the HTC or LLTC. Between 1998 and 2000, she also identified a 44-45%
increase in tax credit take-up, with tax credit usage concentrating towards higher incomes.
Taxpayers in the second highest income range, $50,000 to $75,000 (at this point in time, the
income threshold was $100,000 for married filers), received the highest average credit of $902;
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yet, as a proportion of tax liability, taxpayers with incomes between $10,000 and $30,000
received higher tax credits than what they actually paid in taxes. Furthermore, no taxpayer below
$10,000 in income, received any credit due to the nonrefundable nature of the program at the
time (Long, 2004).
Long (2004) simultaneously tested enrollment behavior using data from the 1990-2000
October Current Population Survey (CPS) to identify indicators of potential eligibility. With
longitudinal data before and after-tax credit implementation, she performed difference-indifferences estimation to causally infer zero enrollment response based on tax credit eligibility.
Difference-in-differences estimation is a quasi-experimental method that analyzes a
counterfactual argument using data before and after an intervention or treatment to indicate
causation. In Long’s (2004) study, this intervention was a policy change, used to identify the
average differential outcome of the control (the pre-policy) group from the treatment (the postpolicy) group at different points in time (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Other key takeaways from
her study included significant decreases (-57%) in state appropriations to public, two-year
colleges whose tuition was less than $1,000 and increases in tuition at both two-year and fouryear, public colleges in states with large financial aid programs (+4.8% and +17.1%,
respectively).
Although Long’s (2004) methodology was sound, there are some validity issues related
to her data such as her estimation of tax filers from both the NPSAS and CPS surveys. Long
(2004) identifies these limitations as she did not have actual individual returns. These limitations
include imprecise measurements of eligibility based on both income and tuition from the NPSAS
survey as the survey measures variables on a school year rather than a tax year. Therefore, it was
not known if tuition for individuals could be used for specific tax years. Furthermore, certain
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CPS survey variables did not parallel with variables from the IRS, making exact connections
harder to identify. The family income variable in the CPS, for instance, was a categorical
variable, which made it harder to identify eligibility and to adjust income for inflation. Lastly,
Long (2004) states that the CPS data was not nationally representative because most of the
respondents attended public, four-year institutions and were all full-time students. It is likely that
eligibility and generalizability were skewed because of these limitations. There may also be
issues with the timing of the study and the data used. It is difficult to witness effects from tax
credit usage just three years after implementation.
Turner (2011) built upon Long’s (2004) research by analyzing education tax credits from
1996-2003 using the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
Also using difference-in-differences estimation, he determined that the SIPP had fewer errors in
measurement, which would provide a better tool for analysis. Turner (2011) also had to assume
potential tax filers using available variables from the survey as he did not have individual tax
return data. However, the results from this study indicate that tax-based aid does encourage
enrollment by 2.2 percentage points (increasing overall to 6.7%) during the first two years of
college, a very different outcome from Long’s (2004) prior study. This may be due to the
different instrument used or the increased time period of the study (five years after
implementation). Incidentally, his 6.7% increase in enrollment is in line with other studies on
price sensitivity and financial aid (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; Linsenmeier, Rosen, & Rouse,
2006; Paulsen, 2001). Though, he confirmed that if all eligible youth took advantage of the taxbased credit, the 7% increase in enrollment would mean that 93% of tax credit recipients would
have enrolled in college regardless of the subsidy (Turner, 2011). His findings are similar to
Dynarski’s on the Georgia HOPE merit scholarship program, where “about 80% of HOPE
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[scholarship] funds flow to those who would have gone to college in the absence of the subsidy”
(Dynarski, 2000, p. 4).
LaLumia (2012) broke from tradition and measured the effect of tax credits on nontraditional students, once again estimating potential tax filers from yet a different instrument, the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)-1979 (sample comprised of 33- to 41-year-old
individuals). Instead of estimation used in prior studies, she used another quasi-experimental
technique - fixed effects modeling with an instrumental variable (assumption of tax eligibility) to
determine causation. Fixed effects estimation holds the potential unobserved factors constant,
thus “fixing” the average effects of each of her measures. As the tax benefits analyzed in
LaLumia’s article (2005 HOPE or Lifetime Learning Credit) were nonrefundable at the time, her
measures included both the dollar value of education tax credits for an eligible person and a
dummy variable to indicate if the dollar value was greater than 0. The latter measure was used
because tax credits were only given to taxpayers who had federal tax liability. She also adds an
instrumental variable to her estimation to account for the endogeneity of college enrollment
behavior and income. Instrumental variables are associated with the independent variable (dollar
value of the tax credit) but not with the dependent variable, which should mediate all unobserved
factors (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). This instrument focuses on the exogenous connection
between tax law and college enrollment. She creates an instrument that predicts tax credit
eligibility in a given year, holding the tax law at the given year, while also controlling for
individual income from 1997 (adjusted for inflation), the year before tax credit implementation.
Her results correspond with Long’s (2004) study, indicating tax credits do not incentivize nontraditional adults to enroll in college or even towards finishing a degree (LaLumia, 2012).
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The Bulman and Hoxby (2015) study is the most recent and exhaustive attempt at
quantifying tax credit effects on college enrollment. Unlike the studies mentioned above, the
authors gained IRS access to individual tax forms for richer data analysis. Using data on exact
eligibility and usage strengthens data validity and provides for more statistically significant
conclusions. First, Bulman and Hoxby (2015) identified the movement of tax receipts to higher
income families after the income threshold increase in 2009, with an increase of $135 million for
households in the $150,001 to $160,000 (the highest income threshold). Likewise, this income
group received the closest maximum credit, averaging $2,261 per family ($2,500 is the
maximum credit). From 2008 to 2009, low-income levels ($20,001 to $30,000) received $94
million more (as opposed to $0 in 2008) in refundable credits, with an average of $800 in
refundable credit. Furthermore, the middle-income levels ($70,001 to $80,000) received 92%
more in tax credits in 2009, totaling $352 million in one year alone (Bulman & Hoxby, 2015).
Therefore, as tax policy changed from 2008 to 2009, the effects of increased generosity and
refundability distributed more tax rewards to higher and lower incomes than ever before, but also
increased the middle-income credits more than any other income group.
Another strength of the Bulman and Hoxby (2015) study is the research design. As prior
studies used instrumental variable or difference-in-differences designs to identify an effect of tax
credits on enrollment, this study used a form of regression discontinuity — specifically the
regression kink design — to analyze data up to 2011. Regression discontinuity designs utilize cut
off scores or measures to assign treatment and control groups close to the cutoff threshold, where
analysis focuses on the “jump” in the intercept term (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001).
Similarly, regression kink designs isolate slope changes, or kinks, which enable researchers to
analyze subtle changes that do not rely on strict cutoff thresholds (Nielsen, Sorenson, & Taber,
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2010). This works well when comparing a continuous variable (education credits) and income
level, which has a smooth transition per phase-out range up to the maximum cutoff level, on each
level’s propensity to enroll in college. For example, Bulman and Hoxby (2015) estimated the
outcome of college attendance for taxpayers just below phase out income ranges and those that
fell within the entire phase out ranges from $107,000 to $180,000 and $53,000 to $90,000 (in
2013 dollars). These income ranges for married and single filers, respectively, received less of
the maximum $2,500 AOTC award because phasing out is a part of established policy.
Employing this design, the authors concluded that education tax credits do not lead to any
discernable increases in college enrollment for these income ranges, similar to the studies from
Long (2004) and LaLumia (2012).
Regression discontinuity designs are a close alternative to randomized control trials
(RCTs) in that the selection of a treatment and a control group is as random as possible for a
quasi-experimental method — the next best research design for causation (Trochim, Donnelly, &
Arora, 2016). The control group is comprised of individuals who fall just below the cutoff score,
and the treatment group is comprised of those just above the cutoff score. Because of this style of
sampling, unobserved variables are somewhat symmetrical for each group — increasing causal
validity. Countless verification studies have identified similar outcomes when comparing the
same analysis using both RCTs and regression discontinuity designs.
Limitations to Bulman and Hoxby’s (2015) study revolve around the inadequacy of the
regression kink analysis to extrapolate data from the income ranges that fall below $53,000 and
$107,000. The regression kink analysis only analyzes data at the phase out ranges, which never
developed during initial analysis of slope change. To remedy this, the authors use the
introduction of the AOTC in 2009 along with typical household behavior per income level as a
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simulated instrumental variable. From this analysis, they identified households in the lowest
income range (up to $35,000) received an increase of about $1,000 in tax credits in 2011, middle
incomes ($40,000-96,000) received an increase of $500, and higher incomes ($116,000$160,000) received an increase of $2,500. Simultaneously, they discovered that these increases,
be they modest or large, did not encourage any income level to enroll as a result.
Tax-based Aid Effects on Income Level
Prior to the establishment of the AOTC and its partial refundability in 2009, the tax credit
benefitted those with enough income to warrant tax liability. As the intention of education credits
is to provide aid to income levels that surpass federal grant eligibility, it is important to evaluate
how tax credits are distributed among incomes. Bulman and Hoxby (2015) found households
with income levels between $70,001 and $80,000 received more credits at a higher frequency
than households with income levels between $20,001 and $30,000 in 2008. Forty-nine percent of
these middle-income households received a credit of $1,394 on average, whereas only seven
percent of the lower income households received a credit of $631 on average. These results
indicated that the HTC and LLTC were predominantly distributed to middle-income levels as
intended. In 2009, 75% of households with incomes ranging from $150,000 to $160,000 received
a credit of $2,261 on average (Bulman & Hoxby, 2015), indicating a movement away from
college affordability for middle-income households.
Table 2 shows this distribution over time before and after the introduction of the partial
refundability of the AOTC. In TY 2006, 1% of education tax expenditures went to taxpayers
with incomes between $100,000 and $180,000 (IRS SOI, 2020b, author’s own calculations). Tax
Year 2011 indicates reward bifurcation away from the middle-income levels to the lower and
upper-middle levels as this reflects the introduction of partial refundability in 2009. In TY 2016,
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taxpayers with incomes between $100,000 and $180,000 received 21.2% of total AOTC
expenditures (IRS SOI, 2020b, author’s own calculations). Due to this expansion, the AOTC
does not function as well as its predecessor, the HTC, in providing aid to middle-income levels.
Since the inception of the ARRA in 2009, taxpayers earning less than $25,000 and more than
$100,000 now receive 48% of total education tax credit expenditures.
Table 2. Distribution of Education Tax Credits by Adjusted Gross Income over Time
TY2006

TY2011

TY2016

Income

% of
total

Amount in
thousands

% of
total

Amount in
thousands

% of
total

Amount in
thousands

<$25,000

17.1%

$1,200,822

27.6%

$6,596,036

26.8%

$6,811,923

$25,000-$49,999

35.9%

$2,518,042

26.6%

$6,359,998

24%

$6,127,746

$50,000-$74,999

24.3%

$1,705,504

16.1%

$3,847,745

15.3%

$3,892,219

$75,000-$99,999

21.7%

$1,526,097

12.3%

$2,941,461

12.5%

$3,160,689

$100,000-$180,000

1%

$71,628

17.3%

$4,138,194

21.2%

$5,389,513

Note. Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income,
Copyright 2020 by IRS.

The refundable provision now seems to reach the lowest incomes more than ever before.
However, tax credits are subtracted per educational assistance dollars, like the Pell Grant, which
are predominantly provided to low-income individuals (Crandall-Hollick, 2018). Education tax
credits are also price sensitive to tuition costs; therefore, students enrolling in higher-priced
institutions receive more tax credits than if they enrolled in a less costly option. Higher-priced
institutions are more selective and rely on standardized testing for admission; therefore, low-
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income students routinely enroll in less costly and less restrictive alternatives, such as
community colleges or technical schools (St. John et al., 2013).
Since tuition for these schools is a fraction of tuition costs at private or more selective
public schools, the eventual tax reimbursement to low-income families is minimal (if anything at
all) especially when combined with a tax-free federal grant or institutional scholarship, which
also must be subtracted from qualified education expenses. For instance, if a student attends a
university that costs $4,000 or more a year, regardless of income category (as long as below
income thresholds), the student can receive the full $2,500 in tax credits. If a student attends a
university that costs $2,000 a year, the total tax credit is much lower at $2,000. Although, the tax
credit would cover the total cost of tuition at a lower-priced institution, the increase in wealthier
students attending higher-priced institutions, drives up the exponential, positive trend in federal
revenue loss.
Other Effects Associated with Tax-based Aid
A complementary issue associated with education tax credits is the idea that colleges and
universities will inflate tuition costs so that students can reap the full benefits of the tax credit,
also known as the Bennett Hypothesis (Bennett, 1987). As this would only be ideal for colleges
that charge less than $2,000 in tuition (where low-income students are concentrated), this issue
seems moot. However, Long (2004) identified a clear pattern of inflated tuition costs in colleges
that cost between $1,000 and $2,000 and had a preponderance of HTC/LLTC-eligible students.
In these colleges, tuition increased 18 percent faster relative to other model specifications that
included lower- and higher-priced institutions with a mixture of tuition price and HTC/LLTCeligible students. However, Bulman and Hoxby (2015) did not produce similar results in a study
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replicated approximately ten years later; therefore, there has been minimal evidence of this
effect.
Theoretical Frameworks for Effectual State Budgeting for Higher Education
Now that I have analyzed the theoretical motivations and empirical assessments of tax
credits on college-going behavior, I can delve further into other cross-disciplinary
theories/concepts that deal with effectual state budgeting - as this is the core motivation of this
study. As states continue to disinvest in public higher education, students and their families are
increasingly paying a larger share of the costs, which continue to increase every year. This
prevents many populations within states from even considering enrolling in postsecondary
schooling, even when employer demand for such degreed populations is high. How can states
remedy the paradoxical messaging of increased state labor force demands for trained workers
and dwindling state public financial support? Intergovernmental grant transfers may be an
answer as already practiced with healthcare programs such as Medicaid, nutritional programs for
low-income families such as WIC and TANF, and various other projects. Theories that underlie
the possible, positive effects of intergovernmental transfers include flypaper effects and
cooperative federalism.
Flypaper effects and state budgeting. Although the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution protects states’ reserved rights, the federal government routinely transfers funds to
states and municipalities in an effort to solidify allegiance to a particular federal policy.
Intergovernmental fund transfers in the U.S. began on the topic of public education with the
Northwest Ordinance of 1785. With the sale of land acquired from Great Britain after the
Revolutionary War, the federal government amassed capital necessary for state protection and
other national growth directives (CRS, 2019). States were provided land (instead of direct cash)
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to comply with federal policy including the allotment of land for public education. Land-grant
fund transfers were again activated in 1862 with the passage of the Morrill Act.
The Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution, ratified in 1913, allowed the federal
government to collect taxes on income and thus, allowed fund transfers in the form of cash as
opposed to land. Since 1913 on, the direct cornerstone for state adherence to federal policy has
been through intergovernmental fund transfers. Since the 1980s, the direction of federal funds
has transitioned from the support of places (highways, public education, hospitals) to support for
individuals. This focal transition is directly caused by the introduction of Medicaid and funding
initiatives prescribed in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (CRS, 2019).
Although intergovernmental fund transfers provide a mechanism for directly, or
indirectly, aligning state and federal initiatives, a phenomenon seems to occur when such
transfers are present in state budgets. This phenomenon, known as the flypaper effect - coined by
Arthur Okun - refers to the potency of federal aid on state budgets rather than direct increases in
citizen’s income for public spending directives. Intuitively, a state would use federal fund
transfers to cut taxes for its citizens, but the opposite seems to occur. The term “flypaper” was
thus coined because intergovernmental fund transfers seemed to stick to wherever the funds hit.
Governments predominantly retained the funds to increase spending on intended programs,
whereas an increase in citizens’ income via economic upturns or state policies tended to stay
with the citizen (Inman, 2009). Although an increase in one’s wealth would potentially increase
the affinity towards philanthropy and social welfare spending, intergovernmental fund transfers
seem to be more potent.
Henderson (1968) and Gramlich (1969) identified that an additional dollar of individual
income corresponded with a $0.02 to $0.05 increase in public spending; however, an additional
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dollar of federal grants led to an increase of $0.30 to almost a dollar ($0.98) in public spending.
Hines & Thaler (1995) reviewed all relevant studies on the flypaper effect since the 1970s and
identified each study’s significant and positive association with intergovernmental grants, with
some studies referencing a $0.25 increase to almost parity ($1.00) in public spending. All in all,
intergovernmental fund transfers seem to be conducive to stimulated growth in that specific area
to which it is delineated.
The results of Question 2 regarding the effects of tax credit revenue on state budgets and
states’ ancillary support of higher education may provide estimates on the presence (or absence)
of flypaper effects for federal spending on higher education. Even though states have disinvested
in higher education since the recessions of 2001 and 2008, Figure 5 indicates that there is a
positive trend in growth in state appropriations as opposed to federal Pell grant funding over
time. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2013) maintained that federal grants were
intended to supplement not supplant state and local government budgets. Matching programs or
Maintenance of Effort (MoE) provisions are key mechanisms to ensure this supplementary action
(CBO, 2013).
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Figure 5. National trends in state appropriations and Pell Grant dispensation 1997-98 to 2016-17, (in
billions). Adapted from “Total Pell Grant Expenditures and Number of Recipients over Time and Total
and Per-Student State and Local Funding and Public Enrollmen over Time,” by CollegeBoard, 2019c,
2019d. Copyright 2019 by CollegeBoard.

Federal-state partnerships and the resurgence of cooperative federalism. This then
relates to an overarching theory of cooperative federalism that underpins the argument for
increased usage of intergovernmental fund transfers. In this study, I will begin the identification
of an innovative method for such transfers via education tax credits to fund state higher
education initiatives. As opposed to fiscal centralization, where the state has sovereign rights
over what and how much to fund within its boundaries or fiscal decentralization, where the
federal government has more sovereign rights over state funding, the functional theory of
cooperative federalism seeks a middle ground to promote national priorities (Hill, 1998;
Musgrave, 1959). In essence, the U.S. government already functions in this manner, both
distributing income via the tax code and with the increased distribution of grant programs with
statutory obligations attached (matching or MoE).
Hill (1998) describes the utility of federalism to ensure democracy, freedom, and national
prosperity, but in a truly marble-cake, amalgam form. With the onslaught of globalization and
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social justice/equity revolutions in the latter half of the twentieth century, states themselves have
become ill-equipped to solve complex issues that have arisen. Furthermore, certain state funding
initiatives, such as education spending, have ramifications for the nation as a whole; therefore, it
is imperative that a collaborative relationship develops rather than a reverting back to dual
federalism - a return to isolated and ineffective governance. Functional cooperative federalism
promotes “plentiful intergovernmental bargaining” between governments ensuring democratic
accountability, much akin to how the federal government enters into contracts with private
organizations (Hill, 1998, p. 939). States, like private organizations, have rights to negotiate and
to decline funding initiatives from the federal government. Framing cooperative federalism in
this manner, sets it apart from movement towards a unitary style, central government, which
more often than not, exemplifies, undemocratic, unequal, authoritarian ideals.
This theory then underpins Question 3 as the fundamental outcome (the effect of state aid
programs on aggregate federal tax savings) will lead to, or negate, the potential power of a
functional cooperative federalist relationship for higher education. Alexander & Arceneaux
(2015) stated that past higher education federal funding initiatives with conditional attributes
(i.e., Morrill Land Grant Acts, SSIG/LEAP, ARRA education stimulus funds) encouraged states
to maintain funding levels or increase them. If a federal-state partnership existed regarding
education tax credits, states could match or maintain a certain level of funding that coincided
with the amount of tax credits awarded. Furthermore, tax credits could be more beneficial if they
were directly provided to the institution the student enrolls in. States and institutions may be
more willing to enter such agreements if they knew tax aid was actually being spent on tuition
and fees rather than through the indirect mechanism practiced currently. Taxpayers are not
required to spend tax savings on tuition and fees; they may spend tax savings on more spur of the
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moment costs. For an institution to receive a tax credit, a student would have to enroll, which
would thus prevent federal revenue from being spent on non-education related activities as is
currently done.
In this tax policy scenario, either federal spending would decrease as tax savings would
only be given to those institutions where students enrolled or more students would enroll due to
the lower cost of tuition, made possible by the influx of state and federal dollars. Therefore, if
this study indicates that states with large financial aid programs receive smaller amounts of
federal tax credits as opposed to other states with smaller aid programs, states could remedy their
aid programs by decreasing award amounts so that more students/institutions receive federal tax
aid instead. This would then allow institutions to lower the cost of tuition - essentially
maintaining the low cost to students as before but alleviating state budgeting woes with federal
aid supplements. However, if this study indicates that states with large financial aid programs
receive more tax credits as opposed to states with smaller aid programs, this evidence could
support the idea of the flypaper effect and may even support the establishment of federal/state
partnerships for the continuous and efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
Remediation of Current Practice for Efficiency and Optimization
Although studies have shown the dismal effects of education tax credits on enrollment
and on income distribution, these tax credit programs could be rectified to serve taxpayers at a
more equitable and efficient rate. Alongside the abovementioned federal-state partnership to
garner lasting state support for higher education, tax credit policy optimization is paramount. To
remediate, several programmatic effects should be analyzed and assessed for efficiency. First,
tax refunds are dispensed almost a full year after initial college acceptance, enrollment, and bill
collection. This programmatic effect can thus deter liquidity-constrained individuals from
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enrolling in the first place (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). During subsequent enrollment
years, taxpayers can usually receive the refund within 21 days; therefore, those who can afford to
pay upfront costs the first year, can fully take advantage of the program for the next three years.
To reach the neediest taxpayers, the timing of refunds should be remediated in order to induce
college enrollment. This action requires colleges and federal governments to work in tandem to
produce the most equitable benefit.
Second, the tax process must be simplified to produce optimal participation at all income
levels. As of TY 2020, taxpayers can choose from among thirteen education tax incentives.
Savvy taxpayers, or those who can afford a professional tax preparer, can manipulate the tax
code for the most desirable return. For instance, the Joint Committee on Taxation (2018b)
presented evidence of duplicative and convoluted effects stemming from the variety of education
tax programs available to the House Ways and Means Committee referencing that:
In 2018, a taxpayer claiming the deduction for tuition and fees will be in a tax bracket no
higher than 22 percent. This translates to a maximum tax benefit of $880, on $4,000 of
tuition payments. Taxpayers eligible to claim the American Opportunity credit (i.e.,
those paying tuition for the first four years of postsecondary education) would receive a
tax credit worth $2,500 for the same tuition payment. Taxpayers eligible to receive the
Lifetime Learning credit (for tuition payments beyond the first four years of
postsecondary education), however, would be eligible for only an $800 credit.
Nonetheless, if tuition payments exceed $4,000, the value of the Lifetime Learning credit
can exceed the deduction for tuition and fees. (p. 20)
Thus, for the average taxpayer, choosing the optimal credit is more of a guessing game.
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) identified positive results for a radically simplified
aid process, where aid eligibility would be entirely based on parents’ adjusted gross income. This
approach is similar to the results in Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, and Sanbonmatsu (2012)’s
FAFSA experiment, where college enrollment increased by eight percentage points after lowincome taxpayers received tax filing assistance and relevant information regarding college aid.
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Simply put, simplification (along with targeted information) can intensify the propensity for
lower-income populations to receive tax credit aid.
Third, to remove windfall payments and to cut costs, higher income eligibility for current
tax savings could be removed from thresholds while maintaining the tax refund component to
taxpayers with low to zero tax liability. If the eligible income capped out at $67,000 for single
filers and $134,000 for married filers as the LLTC does (indexed for inflation), more tax credits
could be funneled to those who are truly in need. Additionally, the federal government should
legislate efficient protocols and mechanisms to confirm federal dollars are not wasted on
erroneous tax claims. In TY 2016, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration’s audit
report found erroneous AOTC/LLTC tax claims totaling $7.4 billion (TIGTA, 2018).
Ultimately, with program remediation and policy optimization, education tax credits
could serve the range of incomes that require supplemental aid to enroll or stay enrolled in
college. Although annual congressional appropriations processes do not evaluate tax
expenditures, this makes them attractive to the higher education community as they are
inconspicuous and limitless. Tax incentives permanently set in the tax code are rarely assessed;
thus, there is no cap on federal spending for such items. Discretionary spending, on the other
hand, is annually set to a certain limit. Of course, with increased uptake by all income levels, this
tax program could become entirely unsustainable and may even deplete discretionary funding as
has been the case with mandatory spending (Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security) demands.
For the tax programs to benefit college-hopeful students and their families without increasing
federal foregone revenue to unfeasible amounts, the recommendations above must be taken into
account to rein in windfall payments and fraud. It is important to perform cost-benefit analyses
on these remedial suggestions as it is entirely plausible that the costs associated with taxpayer
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fraud, the creation of additional administrative/bureaucratic processes and staffing, and
compliance may outweigh the benefits (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2006). Smith (1776/2012)
described these costs as deadweight losses; a detriment to his maxims of optimal tax policy.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
To understand and continue the analysis of education tax credits, pioneered by the
abovementioned authors, and to identify the effects of large financial aid programs on education
tax credits, I developed the following hypotheses that coincided with the research questions in
Part 1.
H1: States vary considerably in the distribution of federal education tax credits, and the
distribution of tax rewards are skewed towards those with higher incomes.
H2: States have responded to increased federal education tax credits via decreased
funding to higher education. Institutions have also increased tuition and fees to capture
the supplementary income provided by federal education tax credits.
H3: States with high levels of aid awarded to students (regardless if classified as need or
merit) receive fewer federal education tax credits.
Specifically, the first two hypotheses updated the research pioneered by Bridget Long
(2004); however, the key outcomes of this study were aggregate measures and did not require
deduction of eligibility from individualized measures. The unit of analysis was therefore the
state, and at times, the institution - not the individual. This differed from prior analyses, which
predominantly studied individual college-going behavior as a result of tax savings. Such studies
had validity issues due to the inexact variables pulled from the various surveys used to measure
individual behavior. The last hypothesis provided a beginning to a much broader analysis of
collaborative and cooperative intergovernmental policymaking. This initiation started with
empirical analysis of siloed policymaking and its effects on state budgeting for elemental
functions of a unified nation.
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Empirical Approach
As I used pre-established numerical data to identify statistical relationships among
variables, I based my research design around quantitative methods via hypothesis testing.
Furthermore, I used descriptive and quasi-experimental designs. Quasi-experimental methods are
usually used in the social science setting when random assignment, the gold-standard in research,
is either impossible or unethical when examining social behavior (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
Quasi-experimental methods use pre-selected treatment and comparison groups based on some
form of matching, which are common in regression discontinuity, propensity score matching,
difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, and time series estimations (Somers, Zhu,
Jacob, & Bloom, 2013; Trochim, Donnelly, & Arora, 2016).
Of these quasi-experimental methods, this study utilized the difference-in-differences
identification strategy, which uses aggregate panel data to identify pre- and post-test differences
between a treatment and control group, thus identifying a counterfactual trend (Angrist &
Pischke, 2009). Difference-in-differences, or DD, is an econometric method used more
frequently in educational studies as its use requires panel data of as little as three time periods to
identify trends and treatment effects before and after a policy change. This research strategy is
related to fixed effects modeling, which requires panel data, and treats the individual and time
effects as parameters to be estimated. Thus, this treatment over the individual level reduces
omitted variable bias. The difference between fixed effects modeling and difference-indifferences is the unit of analysis is in aggregate form; furthermore, the analysis looks for a
causal relationship between two groups over a certain period in time (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
Many statistical professionals argue that three time periods is usually inadequate to determine
valid causal effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Somers et al., 2013). Increased time observations
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provide more reliable and accurate data on the underlying aggregate-level unit and year trends
that would occur regardless of the policy and the resultant treatment trends after the policy. The
main difference between prior studies using difference-in-differences estimation (Long, 2004;
Turner 2011) and this study was the availability of approximately two decades of data instead of
two or three time observations before and after a policy change. This subtle difference provides
more predictive power, reducing bias, and increasing validity as the follow-up period before the
policy change controls for unforeseen variation unaffiliated with the policy change itself (Bloom,
2003; Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002; Somers et al., 2013). A difference-in-differences design
without many time observations before the treatment may provide false proof that the
introduction of a policy caused a change in an outcome between the control and treatment group
when, in actuality, the change after the policy shock was just a natural growth trend between the
two groups. Although there are distinctions between the various quasi-experimental designs, DD
routinely provides RCT-replicable outcomes. For instance, Somers et al. (2013) performed
validation tests on difference-in-differences and comparative interrupted time series designs and
found that they were both highly capable of producing internally valid estimates, similar to those
of RCTs.

49

Policy Shock
35
30

Change from
baseline mean

25
20
15
10

Change from
baseline
mean

5
0

2002

2007

2009
Control

2012

2015

Treatment

Figure 6. Difference-in-differences graphical representation

In summation, the research methodology to follow analyzed all three hypotheses in this
chapter. As each hypothesis involved different research designs with different methods of data
collection, they each were explored separately. I thus provided separate sections on context, data
sources, data collection, research design, and statistical techniques. For each hypothesis,
assumptions and limitations were stated to ensure validity measures were scrutinized.
Distribution of Education Tax Credits
Context. Although Long (2004) and Bulman and Hoxby (2015) identified the distribution
of tax credits to summarize the take-up and costs of the tax credits, their data came from 2009 or
earlier IRS tax data. Before making deeper inferences about the effects of tax credits and their
interaction with large state financial aid programs, the analysis of the distribution of education
tax credits in four separate time frames have helped describe the role they play for the average,
American taxpayer. These four time periods are crucial markers of education tax policy
development. Tax Years 1998, 2009, 2015, and 2016 provided information on tax credit take-up
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and federal expenditures one year after the Hope Tax Credit, one year after the American
Opportunity Tax Credit, and one year after the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act, which
made the AOTC permanent. Tax Year 2016 was the latest data available from the IRS at the time
of this data collection.
Data and data collection. The data for this analysis came from the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) Sources of Income (SOI) Tax Statistics, which was publicly available and easily
accessible. Specifically, the data most relevant to identify the distribution of education tax credits
was the Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Statistics by State and Size of Adjusted
Gross Income (IRS SOI, 2020b). Data for each state was available from TY 1996 to TY 2017.
As specified in the Revenue Act of 1916, the IRS’s Statistical Information Services, which
oversees the SOI database, collects and publishes statistics on internal revenue operations of the
nation (IRS, 2020a). The state data files were generated from the master file of individual
income tax returns filed during a tax year.
The IRS SOI uses a different definition of “tax year” than mentioned in prior chapters. In
all datasets, the tax year is for all income tax returns filed during the following year. Therefore,
TY 2017 (the last year of data from the IRS SOI database) references income tax returns that
were filed and analyzed by the IRS from January 1 to December 31, 2018 (IRS SOI, 2020a,
2020b, 2020c). This discrepancy is due to the necessary lag time in processing and analyzing of
data. Therefore, the data referenced in this section forward refers to the IRS’ definition of a Tax
Year - from Calendar Year 1997 to 2018. It is important to note that actual state populations will
not always correspond with SOI state data as not all citizens are required to file an income tax
return.
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Furthermore, the IRS data is not based on the entire population of returns in a given year.
The IRS uses stratified probability sampling, which is then weighted by dividing the total
population of a stratum by the sampling of that stratum. The result is an approximate estimate of
the entire population of returns within a given year. The IRS’ Enterprise Computing Center is
responsible for sample selection and data cleaning and, where necessary, the Center imputes data
based on prior-year data (IRS, 2020b).
To determine state average tuition and fee amounts and the population enrolled in
college, I used the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Institutional
Characteristics, Student Financial Aid and Net Price, and Fall Enrollment surveys (Institute of
Education Sciences, 2020). The Institutional Characteristics Survey provided in-state average
tuition and fees for full-time undergraduates, and the Student Financial Aid and Net Price Survey
provided average state grant/scholarship amounts to be subtracted from the average tuition and
fees. This gave an approximate measure of the net cost for state citizens that could be used to
claim education tax credits. Fall enrollment headcounts served as a proxy for amount of the state
population enrolled in a postsecondary institution for that given year. The survey provided data
on undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in an education tax-eligible institution both fulltime and part-time. These basic qualifications are necessary to qualify for an education tax credit.
The IPEDS data is collected annually from surveys conducted by the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) and provides information from every college, university, and
technical school that participates in Title IV federal financial aid programs (IES, 2020).
I also used the U.S. Census Bureau’s Income Summary Measures Table and Historical
Data to identify median household income per state. Data was derived from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) — a monthly survey that has existed for the past fifty years. The U.S.
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Census Bureau interviews a total of approximately 54,000 households, with ages spanning from
15 and over. The sample is then weighted to represent the nation as a whole (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2020a).
Research design and statistical procedures. To analyze the distribution of tax credits and
determine if education tax credits are skewed towards higher income levels, I tabulated the
descriptive statistics of total education tax credits (both refundable and nonrefundable) received
for each state across four time periods. These time periods included one-year lags after key
education tax credit policy implementation, including the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and the Protecting Americans from Tax
Hikes of 2015. For each year, I then created a table delineated by state with columns for the total
number of returns, the total dollar amount of credits, three income categories to capture low,
middle, and high strata. For each state, I provided a sub-row of data concerning the mean credit
per return and the percent of returns within each income range to identify which state had the
highest average credit per capita and to see how many taxpayers within a state actually received
tax credits, respective of income.
Upon ranking the first five and last five states on percent of returns, I created a table
comparing their population enrolled in college during the given year, the average tuition and fees
of in-state colleges, average state grant awarded, unemployment rate, and median family income
- all variables mentioned in prior research that influence the rate of education tax credit take-up
(Long, 2004; McPherson and Baum, 2017). Analysis of these descriptive statistics provided
evidence that state characteristics alter the distribution of tax credits, which established the
necessity for the article’s main analysis in Hypothesis 3. Additional tables also illustrated the
amount of tax liability (the amount each taxpayer owes to the federal government) offset by
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education tax credits (both nonrefundable and refundable, when applicable) for different income
groups for each of the four time periods. These tables thus described any patterns of education
tax credit receipts and movement towards different income groups over time, due to the changing
eligibility requirements of the policies. This essentially tells the reader which income group has
benefitted the most from education tax credits through the years. The results of this section added
to the descriptive statistics provided by Long (2004) and Bulman and Hoxby (2015), providing
updated information on education tax credits and its resultant effects on taxpayers.
State and Institutional Response to Education Tax Credits
Context. Long (2004) has been the sole author to identify the approximate effects of
education tax credits on state appropriations and college pricing since educational tax policy
implementation in 1998. Due to the additional funds provided by educational tax credits from a
revenue source other than institutions within-state, states may decrease appropriations to higher
education or institutions may increase tuition to capture additive taxpayer liquidity. Of note,
Long’s (2004) analysis coincided with the expired HTC with a maximum tax credit of $1,500.
The HTC also did not have a refundable portion for taxpayers with zero tax liability. Her results
illuminated important outcomes: 1) state appropriations actually increased for institutions that
had many credit-eligible students yet fell for two-year schools charging less than $1000 in tuition
and 2) two-year schools charging between $1000 and $2000 with many credit-eligible students
increased tuition by 18% after HTC implementation, yet more expensive, four-year schools
actually saw a decrease in tuition. Therefore, Long’s (2004) results neither supported nor negated
her theory that states and institutions use federal funding to supplant - not supplement - state
dollars.
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To update education tax credit analysis, this study utilized the increased amount of the
AOTC (maximum award of $2,500) and its refundability option, which now benefits lowerincome taxpayers - a component not applicable in Long’s (2004) analysis. Based on prior studies
and the updated education tax credit award amounts, state and institutional actions should be
more evident in institutions with average net tuition and fees lower than $4,000 as the maximum
award of $2,500 is only awarded to students enrolled in an institution charging more than $4,000.
Institutions charging less than $4,000 in average net tuition and fees would prevent taxpayers
from receiving the potential maximum amount. The results of this analysis have provided
rudimentary evidence of the presence or absence of a flypaper effect of intergovernmental fund
transfers for higher education.
Data and data collection. The data for the analysis of state and institutional responses to
education tax credits derived from the IPEDS Institutional Characteristics, Fall Enrollment,
Student Financial Aid and Net Price, and Finance Surveys, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Unemployment Statistics, the United States Census Bureau Historical Income Tables for
Households and Regional Definitions Table, and the United States Census Bureau Population
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States Table (U.S. Census Bureau,
2020e). All variables were collected and identified by state but analyzed in aggregate to
determine a nationally representative outcome. The timeframe for data was TY 2001-2016 —
eight years prior to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and eight years after.
Variables. The following variables were collected per sector. Therefore, three different
models were analyzed for public two-year, public four-year, and private sectors — all data
available within the Institutional Characteristics Survey in IPEDS. For-profit and not-for-profit
institutions were combined as there was not enough variance in the dummy variable for low-
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priced institutions in the for-profit sector. Less than 1% of the for-profit institutions were priced
less than $4,000 after average state grants. All dollar amounts were also adjusted to real 2017
dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
State appropriations per full-time equivalent (FTE) or published, in-state tuition and fees
(dependent on public or private sector) served as a dependent variable for this analysis. State
appropriations data came from the IPEDS Finance Survey, which was divided by the full-time
equivalent fall enrollment (from the Fall Enrollment Survey) per institution. State appropriations,
as defined by IPEDS, are amounts received by a Title IV-eligible institution through legislative
acts (IPEDS, 2020). This variable does not include grants, contracts, and capital appropriations.
The term full-time equivalent counts all full-time enrollment plus the full-time equivalent of parttime students (IPEDS, 2020). Each analysis used this data as sector-aggregates.
Published Tuition and Fees was another dependent variable in a separate DD analysis
using the same control variables. The IPEDS Institutional Characteristics Survey provided instate average tuition and fees for full-time undergraduates. These two data sources were
combined into one variable indicating total in-state costs for students. The combination of instate tuition and fees per institution removed the unwanted charges for room and board and other
expenses (included within cost of attendance variables) that would not be considered eligible for
tax credits. As private institutions do not receive state appropriations in their institutional
budgets, this variable captured the possible institutional response of the introduction of education
tax credits. This dependent variable was also used in separate models to indicate if the public
sector increased tuition and fees in concert with the introduction of education tax credits.
Low-Priced Institutions served as the treatment group in all models. These institutions
were those priced less than $4,000 ($3,999 or below) a year (after reducing average
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grant/scholarships). Students enrolled in these institutions would not receive the full education
tax award if meeting income eligibility; therefore, these institutions may have an incentive to
raise tuition and fees. To quantify low- or high-priced institutions, the IPEDS Institutional
Characteristics Survey provided in-state average tuition and fees for full-time undergraduates,
and the Student Financial Aid and Net Price Survey provided average state grant/scholarship
amounts to be subtracted from the average tuition and fees. Subtracting average, state grant aid
from the average, in-state tuition and fees variable gave an approximate measure of the net costs
for state citizens that could be used to claim education tax credits. It would be problematic to use
the in-state tuition and fees data alone for the public sector as many taxpayers receive state needor merit-aid, which can alter the amount of education tax credits received. Providing an estimate
of what the average student pays after aid receipts was a better representation of tuition levels
affected by education tax credits. All three models used this treatment variable in the regressions
as available data for state grants in the IPEDS database indicated that public and private
institutions received some form of state grant.
High-Priced Institutions served as a control group in all models. These institutions were
those priced $4,000 or more a year (after reducing average grant/scholarships). To receive the
full AOTC award (which has the highest award when comparing the two education tax credits), a
student must pay out-of-pocket at least $4,000 in tuition and fees.
Annual Median Household Income was one of five variables that acted as additional
controls in the DD estimation. Because education tax credit eligibility depends on one’s
earnings, the annual median household income by state served this function. The Census Bureau
measures income by household and by individual through annual surveys reflecting not the
average (as extreme outliers in both the high- and low-income strata can alter this amount) but
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the median amount of regular, incoming money before “payments for personal income tax, social
security, union dues, Medicare deductions, etc.” (U.S. Census Bureau, para. 1, 2020b). This was
useful because tax deductions throughout the year are based on the amount of earned income in
that year. This variable was a good measure for demonstrating a state’s proportion of taxpayer’s
eligible for an education tax credit. Furthermore, the household was used instead of the
individual because most college students enrolled are still dependents, and education tax credits
can be claimed for each child enrolled in an eligible institution.
Postsecondary enrollment was another control variable that demonstrated a state’s
proportion eligible for education tax credits as a recipient must be enrolled in an eligible
institution. The IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey provided data on all full- and part-time students
enrolled in a Title IV-eligible institution per given year. This data provided a grand total of all
undergraduates and graduates enrolled in both a degree-seeking and non-degree seeking
program. This variable captured all students eligible for both the AOTC and the LLTC as the
LLTC only demands a student be enrolled in at least one course per semester.
Unemployment rates correspond with the health of a state’s economy and also served as a
poverty measure; therefore, this variable served as a third control variable for the analysis. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects this data every month for each state. The
unemployment rate equals the total unemployed workforce divided by the total labor force. The
labor force does not include people who are retired, students, and those not actively looking for
work. This data was collected for each state for every applicable year.
A state’s population can also affect the intake of education tax credits, particularly in
very large states such as California, Texas, and New York. The total amount of tax credits in a
given year for these three states alone doubled the amounts in the other 47 states. Controlling for
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the population size is a way to weight the data, so that all states are treated similarly in the
analysis. The Census Bureau produces estimates on state populations annually by using measures
of population change measured against the most recent decennial census (Census Bureau,
2020e).
Lastly, Long (2004) utilized region as a control group as different regions share similar
educational policy. The regions used in this analysis were the same as the U.S. Census Bureau’s
regions and divisions of the United States. These are divided into nine regions: New England,
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central,
West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. This was an important control variable as Long
(2004) identified significant changes among tuition differentials and state appropriate levels over
time among regions, most notably in the Southeast region (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020c).
Research design and statistical procedures. Using DD estimation, I compared the
amount of state appropriations per FTE and published tuition and fees before and after the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, which implemented the more
generous and expansive American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC). First, the analysis isolated
the difference of the outcome variables within each aggregated sector before and after 2009.
Then, the differences were determined for the treatment group before and after 2009. Finally,
the two differences from the treatment and control group were identified to indicate the longterm impacts of the tax policy. This analysis determined whether state appropriations per FTE or
published tuition and fees were affected by the implementation of the tax credit policy more so
for low-priced institutions and high-priced institutions, dependent on sector.
I used the formula,
yt = β0 + β1dB + β2X + δ0d2 + δ1d2 ∙ dB + u,
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where the dependent variable (y) was either the sector-aggregate amount of state appropriations
per FTE or the sector-aggregate published tuition and fees per year. The independent variables
included: the intercept denoted by β0, β1dB for the slope change in the difference between the
treatment and control groups before policy implementation, β2X for the magnitude of control
variables effects, δ0d2 representing a time dummy variable for fixed effects that would cause
changes in the dependent variable absent the policy change, and the interaction term δ1d2 ∙ dB
captured the interaction term of the time dummy variable for fixed effects that would cause
changes in the dependent variable after the policy change (Umbricht, Fernandez & Ortagus,
2017). δ1, thus represented the difference-in-differences estimator:
δ1 = (ȳB,2 - ȳB,1) - (ȳA,2 - ȳA,1).
The timeframe for the analysis followed eight years before the ARRA implementation
and eight years after (TY 2001-2016). The unit of analysis for this research question was sectoraggregated national data (public, private, and for-profit) of institutions present throughout every
year of the analysis. The stable presence of institutions, or balanced data, over sixteen years
strengthened the validity of the study. Institutions originate and terminate frequently over time,
which can skew the difference estimator for pre- and post-policy implementation.
This estimation was repeated twice overall with five models to account for the different
postsecondary sectors. The first and second models ran state appropriations per FTE as the
dependent variable, utilizing both the high-priced institutions ($4,000 and above) as a control
group and low-priced institutions (less than $4,000) as a treatment group, isolating each
treatment and control group into their respective sectors for the two public specifications. The
third, fourth, and fifth models ran the same thing but with published tuition and fees as the
dependent variable for each sector — public and private. The rest of the control variables were
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utilized for both estimations, which accounted for institutional and year fixed effects, household
wealth, state population, poverty, postsecondary enrollment, and region.
The first step in this DD design was estimating the baseline mean in state appropriations
per FTE per sector or published, in-state tuition and fees per sector during the pre-policy period.
Then, I estimated the amount these dependent variables deviated from their baseline mean in the
post-policy period. The average change in trend are subsequently obtained for both the control
and treatment groups. The impact of the policy was estimated as the difference between the
change in mean of the treatment group and the change in mean of the control group. If the
introduction of the ARRA of 2009 created a change in published, in-state tuition and fees or state
appropriations nationally, the mean change for the treatment group would be greater than that for
the control group.
Assumptions and limitations. As in any linear regression analysis, assumptions included
independence, normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Proper data screening and
transformations, if applicable, were performed for each variable to ensure independence,
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Difference-in-differences estimation suffers from the
possibility of endogeneity due to omitted variable bias or the confluence between the policy
implementation and pre-existing trends. This analysis utilized several years of data and
controlled for important state-level demographic and economic conditions to lessen any possible
effects of endogeneity. Angrist & Pischke (2009) stated that the parallel line assumption can be
met if several time observations are utilized to indicate that the treatment and control groups
would follow parallel lines in the absence of the treatment effect. Furthermore, as units of
observation may differ, the aggregate unit-level and year fixed effects associated with the DD
design eliminated possibilities of individual, unobserved effects. DD estimation also suffers from
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the possibility of serial correlation, which violates the linear regression assumption that
observations are independent. Time is usually correlated because each consecutive year is similar
to the other. This serial correlation can cause biased standard error and confidence interval
measurements in regression estimates (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan, 2004). To remediate
serial correlation, I controlled for within-cluster serial correlation using the cluster-robust
standard errors command, which is now incorporated into newer versions of STATA, using the
command vce. This command scales the estimated variance matrix to make the error terms less
biased (STATA, 2020). Lagged data can also cause extreme cases of serial correlation. Lagging
the time variable would be beneficial if the analysis was looking at the introduction of education
tax credits and the slow take-up rate associated with the 1998 implementation. However,
education tax credits during the time of this analysis had been in existence for a long time.
Therefore, lagged data was not needed.
Although violations and limitations were diminished as much as possible in this analysis,
there will still be minor limitations to this study. Even though I used longer time references to
combat confounding errors, unique identifiers across all sixteen years to remove as much bias to
coefficients of interest, and statistical commands that transformed and alleviated violations of
assumptions, there may still be an instance of pre- or post-policy omitted variable bias. Some
other potent law, policy, or event may have caused or influenced the outcomes of this analysis.
Without a true experimental procedure, there will always be the threat of omitted variable biases.
Effect of Large State Aid Programs on Education Tax Credit Distribution
Context. Because tax-free scholarships interact with the eligibility requirements for
education tax credits, there is a possibility that states rewarding large amounts of grant aid to
state citizens receive less education tax credits than states rewarding less. If a student receives a
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tax-free scholarship, then when tax filing time comes, the taxpayer may be ineligible to receive
one of the education tax credits. However, if the costs of tuition and fees exceed the grant
amount, the difference can be used to redeem an education tax credit. Furthermore, if a taxpayer
adds the tax-free scholarship into their taxable income, they can then qualify for education tax
credits. This is useful for taxpayers who use a tax professional to file or who are knowledgeable
about the loopholes in the tax code. Adding the scholarship into one’s taxable income may do
more harm than good if it raises the taxpayer’s tax bracket, causing them to owe more taxes. This
loophole cannot be utilized if the intent of the scholarship (as stated in legal statute) is explicitly
for tuition and fees.
For example, the Louisiana Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (TOPS), as it
currently exists, was signed into law in 1997. Two years later, the 1999 Louisiana Legislature
amended the original Acts to modify the purpose of the award from “pay[ing] the student’s
tuition” to “award[ing] an amount to be determined by the administering agency to equal the
weighted average of amounts paid … for students attending public colleges and universities”
(Kalinka, 1999; LA Rev Stat § 17:3048.1). This slight modification gave Louisiana taxpayers the
opportunity to receive both the education tax credit and the TOPS scholarship if the taxpayer
included the scholarship into taxable income. The Louisiana Legislature worked around IRS
eligibility requirements to allow savvy taxpayers to double-dip if they so desired. As this
requires somewhat complicated mathematical calculations or additional income for a tax
preparer, the average Louisiana taxpayer does not utilize this state loophole.
As states with large merit- and need-based aid programs scramble to find additional
funding for their continuously increasing and unsustainable programs, it was the intent of this
analysis to identify any loss of possible funds from the federal government caused by state aid
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generosity. California already spends approximately $2 billion annually on grant aid for higher
education. New York and Texas spend close to $1 billion annually on grant aid for higher
education (NASSGAP, 2020). Many more spend between $300-$700 million a year on grant aid.
The question of whether state aid programs are beneficial to state citizens was therefore not
under analysis here, but rather whether these states were receiving less federal funding due to the
generosity of their internal policies.
Data and data collection. The data for the analysis of large state aid programs on
education tax credit distribution derived from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Sources of
Income (SOI) Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Statistics by State and Size of
Adjusted Gross Income (IRS SOI, 2020b), the National Association of State Student Grant and
Aid Programs (NASSGAP), and the IPEDS, Census Bureau, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data
used for Research Question #2. NASSGAP produces annual surveys regarding state grant
expenditures for postsecondary education since 1969. The timeframe for data for this analysis
was from TY 2001-2016 - eight years prior to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 and eight years after.
Variables. The total amount of education tax credits per state was the dependent variable
in this analysis. Using the IRS SOI Statistics by State, this variable consisted of all state data
from Tax Year 2001 (Calendar Year 2002) to Tax Year 2016 (Calendar Year 2017). This was
more than sufficient data for a DD design (Somers et al., 2013). The variable measured how
much the federal government allocated to the state regardless of population, population enrolled,
poverty, region, and other state economic circumstances. Control variables added to the model
separated out these possible effects on the outcome.
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High-aid states served as the treatment group for the DD estimation. Upon ranking the 50
states based on the NASSGAP Survey data for Academic Year (AY) 2016-17, a clear distinction
between the top 17 states and the rest of the states appeared. These states provided around $200
million to $2 billion in state grant aid in AY 2016-17. There was a natural break between
Minnesota ($196 million) and Ohio ($131 million); therefore, this analysis utilized a “high-aid
state” treatment group made up of the seventeen states that provided the largest amount of state
grants to its citizens. See Appendix for a list of these states. Furthermore, Long (2004) excluded
states with broad-based grant aid that covered the cost of tuition and fees (Georgia, New Mexico,
and Florida) from her analysis as her analysis focused on the effect of education tax credits on
college pricing. States with these comprehensive aid programs (Georgia HOPE, New Mexico
Legislative Lottery, and Florida Bright Futures) had no incentive to increase tuition and fees as
this would increase state spending automatically for such programs. 2 This study differed from
Long’s (2004) analysis in that the outcome was the amount of education tax credits a state
received, which may be affected by the amount of state aid provided regardless if the aid covered
the entire cost of tuition and fees or not. The data for this and the next variable came from the
NASSGAP Annual Survey data from Academic Year 2001-02 to Academic Year 2017-18.
Low-aid states served as the control group in this analysis, a variable to which the
treatment group was compared. In the first model, this variable was comprised of the seventeen
states with the lowest amount of state aid given to citizens for higher education. In the second
model, this variable and the treatment group consisted of the next highest seventeen high- and

2

Although Long (2004) analyzed broad-based state aid programs from 1998-2000, she did not include the
Louisiana Taylor Opportunity Plan for Students (TOPS) in her analysis. The TOPS program was in
existence at this time; it was passed into law in 1997. The HOPE program began in 1993, but the Bright
Futures program began in 1997. Therefore, it is not clear why the TOPS program was not included.
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low-aid states, removing the states that provided the largest amount of broad-based state grants
to identify if these states skewed the outcome. The states in the low-aid category provided less
than $1 million (New Hampshire) to $35 million (Connecticut) in state grant aid. This group
provided a good comparison to determine if states with high or low amounts of state aid received
more or less education tax credits over the 16-year timeframe (TY 2001-2016).
This analysis utilized the same control variables analyzed in Research Question #2. As
median household income per year, the unemployment rate per year, population size, state
citizens enrolled in postsecondary institutions, and region were powerful variables that could
possibly affect the outcome, it was important to control for such effects. This helped isolate
causation towards the policy shock — the implementation of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 — itself. These control variables were isolated to the number of states
involved in each model.
I also added the total number of private postsecondary institutions within a given state as
an additional control variable. This variable isolated and identified states that had more
institutions with higher tuition and fees. Private schools usually have much higher costs, which
would lead many taxpayers to take full advantage of the education tax credits - even with the
help of hefty scholarships. The leftover balance minus available scholarships tend to be much
higher than the $4,000 minimum required to receive the full tax credit. As Hypothesis 2 already
identified sector within the analysis, this control variable ensured a similar function for
Hypothesis 3.
Research design and statistical procedures. I used the same formula in Research
Question #2 (DD estimation),
yt = β0 + β1dB + β2X + δ0d2 + δ1d2 ∙ dB + u,
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where the dependent variable (y) was the aggregate amount of education tax credits received by
each state per year. The independent variables included: the intercept denoted by β0, β1dB for the
slope change in the difference between the treatment and control groups before policy
implementation, β2X for the magnitude of control variables effects, δ0d2 representing a time
dummy variable for fixed effects that would cause changes in the dependent variable absent the
policy change, and the interaction term δ1d2 ∙ dB captured the interaction term of the time
dummy variable for fixed effects that would cause changes in the dependent variable after the
policy change. δ1, thus represented the difference-in-difference estimator:
δ1 = (ȳB,2 - ȳB,1) - (ȳA,2 - ȳA,1).
The time frame involved eight years before the ARRA implementation and eight years after
(TY 2001-2016). State-level data was utilized throughout this research question.
I conducted the analysis two times, consisting of two different models. I ran the DD
estimation first for the seventeen high- and low-aid states including the states with broad-based
aid programs. I then ran the same analysis excluding states with broad-based grant aid that
covered the full or the approximate full cost of tuition and fees (California, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Louisiana, and Tennessee). Removing these six states allowed for the inclusion of six
other states in the ranking (Ohio, Colorado, Missouri, Wisconsin, Arkansas, and Michigan) to
keep the sample at 34 states. This last analysis that excluded states with very generous aid
programs provided an even deeper estimate on the effects of these programs on education tax
credit distribution.
Assumptions and limitations. As mentioned in Hypothesis #2, all data screening required
for a linear regression analysis were performed to ensure basic assumptions were met. I also
analyzed parallel line graphs to determine if trends before the policy shock were similar and
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consistent over time. Furthermore, using control variables I eliminated as much as possible any
effects of omitted variables, concentrating the analysis on the effect of the policy shock alone.
Finally, the use of robust standard errors alleviated serial correlation of the error term. As this
was not an RCT, there will always be the possibility of omitted variable bias. Without the
possibility of an RCT associated with education tax credits and state aid programs, this is to be
expected. Therefore, a limitation of this study was the full possibility that causation associated
with the outcomes of all the analyses mentioned above is slightly affected by an omitted variable
not taken into account in the control variables or by the policy shock itself.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
The following results correspond with the three hypotheses made in Chapter 3 as each
hypothesis builds upon and coexists with the other. Within each section, I restate each
hypothesis. I also analyze the results with tables and figures to help visualize the outcomes. Each
section provides a brief review of how the results fit with the theoretical frameworks. However, I
provide more detail in the discussion section into the theoretical connections and the impact and
meaning of the results.
Distribution of Education Tax Credits
Hypothesis 1: States vary considerably in the distribution of federal education tax credits, and
the distribution of tax rewards are skewed towards those with higher incomes.
Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 detail tax credit distribution per state (sans the District of Columbia)
for four time periods: one year after tax credit implementation (Tax Year 1998), one year after
AOTC implementation (Tax Year 2009), one year after the AOTC became permanent (Tax Year
2015), and the most recent Tax Year data available (Tax Year 2016). Each table is further
delineated by tax credit distribution per income (low, middle, and upper) to show which incomes
benefit the most per time period; mean credit per return to highlight the average amount received
per capita; and the percent of returns within a state that actually received some form of tax credit.
Each table is adjusted for inflation using real 2017 dollars — the latest data year available in the
SOI.
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Table 3. TY 1998 (CY 1999) One Year after TRA of 1997 Implementation in Real 2017 Dollars
State

US
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC

Total
Amount (in
000s)
$5,130,658
$69,097
$13,854
$63,636
$$33,060
$432,558
$82,591
$74,580
$13,932
$188,690
$88,501
$27,312
$24,242
$258,203
$126,225
$84,848
$50,714
$63,181
$59,071
$27,969
$107,139
$153,996
$215,308
$135,240
$30,693
$102,320
$19,571
$41,175
$24,998
$32,186
$202,958
$19,181
$459,498
$115,955
$17,958
$245,649
$47,423
$61,279
$304,951
$22,315
$61,105

Low-Income
(Under $49K)
(in 000s)
$2,608,027
$35,395
$7,684
$36,898
$17,973
$250,442
$44,861
$33,031
$6,436
$115,718
$48,663
$14,720
$12,345
$119,175
$53,893
$40,705
$23,730
$30,665
$31,332
$12,854
$56,131
$74,846
$100,369
$60,575
$15,787
$50,957
$10,560
$20,169
$14,843
$14,541
$101,147
$10,913
$253,391
$58,230
$8,913
$107,247
$25,744
$32,518
$137,901
$10,552
$30,400

Middle-Income Upper-Income
Mean
Percent
($50K-$99K)
($100K and
Credit Per
of
(in 000s)
above) (in 000s)
Return
Returns
$2,519,134
$3,496
$1,072.28
3.8
$33,652
$50
$1,038.91
3.5
$6,170
0
$941.61
4.5
$26,688
$50
$818.40
3.8
$15,087
0
$972.65
3.1
$181,388
$728
$827.08
3.7
$37,730
0
$996.89
4.2
$41,492
$57
$1,231.09
3.7
$7,472
$23
$1,108.41
3.5
$72,841
$130
$959.86
2.8
$39,728
$110
$1,002.98
2.5
$12,588
$4
$1,035.66
4.8
$11,887
$10
$994.43
4.6
$138,800
$227
$1,124.17
4.1
$72,333
0
$1,198.24
3.8
$44,143
0
$1,110.72
5.7
$26,964
$21
$858.15
4.9
$32,489
$26
$1,041.11
3.6
$27,699
$40
$1,025.41
3.1
$15,115
0
$1,358.16
3.5
$50,859
$149
$1,123.31
3.9
$79,018
$132
$1,242.95
4.1
$114,809
$130
$1,089.69
4.4
$74,599
$66
$1,207.17
4.9
$14,906
0
$980.55
2.7
$51,363
0
$998.64
4.1
$9,010
$1
$1,145.11
4.2
$21,007
0
$970.50
5.3
$10,155
0
$830.28
3.4
$17,617
$28
$1,321.74
4.1
$101,545
$267
$1,266.83
4.1
$8,269
0
$738.77
3.4
$205,907
$201
$1,255.93
4.4
$57,634
$89
$927.70
3.6
$9,041
$4
$1,126.12
5.3
$138,291
$110
$1,259.17
3.6
$21,679
0
$861.46
3.8
$28,761
0
$982.45
4.1
$166,853
$198
$1,381.10
3.9
$11,762
0
$1,167.20
4
$30,667
$38
$1,005.61
3.5

(table cont’d)
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State

Total
Low-Income
Middle-Income Upper-Income
Mean
Percent
Amount (in (Under $49K)
($50K-$99K)
($100K and
Credit Per
of
000s)
(in 000s)
(in 000s)
above) (in 000s)
Return
Returns
SD
$21,544
$11,627
$9,912
$4
$1,209.66
5.2
TN
$90,514
$47,973
$42,455
$83
$1,054.16
3.4
TX
$293,295
$156,253
$136,852
$189
$1,001.87
3.4
UT
$56,387
$32,212
$24,175
0
$1,049.74
6
VT
$12,067
$4,251
$7,816
0
$1,113.80
3.8
VA
$131,080
$64,024
$66,917
$138
$1,025.86
4
WA
$111,271
$53,819
$57,374
$78
$1,034.47
4
WV
$30,511
$13,168
$17,314
$26
$1,123.24
3.7
WI
$133,296
$56,194
$77,070
$32
$1,085.36
4.9
WY
$9,115
$4,128
$4,988
0
$919.35
4.3
Note: Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income,
Copyright 2020 by IRS.

Table 4. TY 2009 (CY 2010) One Year after ARRA of 2009 Implementation in Real 2017
Dollars
State

US
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN

Total
Amount (in
000s)
$20,731,697
$316,015
$44,354
$324,406
$130,930
$2,105,002
$357,938
$270,220
$58,509
$1,368,258
$660,280
$86,253
$88,035
$1,017,180
$438,448
$267,549
$187,335
$239,826
$236,998
$85,196
$453,068
$513,828
$798,967
$460,352

Low-Income
(Under $49K)
(in 000s)
$9,618,541
$166,429
$20,918
$164,030
$64,148
$1,062,530
$157,596
$98,359
$24,254
$906,120
$375,629
$36,353
$42,648
$430,020
$168,877
$89,795
$73,789
$103,698
$126,889
$31,950
$197,991
$201,640
$341,458
$167,530

Middle-Income
($50K-$99K)
(in 000s)
$7,152,047
$100,571
$13,937
$107,244
$47,226
$654,381
$123,836
$94,734
$20,575
$333,097
$195,587
$32,553
$31,999
$365,402
$184,506
$129,112
$72,977
$94,463
$72,652
$36,270
$145,897
$176,954
$301,909
$183,194

(table cont’d)
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Upper-Income
Mean
Percent
($100K and
Credit Per
of
above) (in 000s)
Return
Returns
3,961,108 $1,063.31
13.8
$49,016 $1,065.45
14.5
$9,499
$990.97
12.5
$53,133
$910.69
13.3
$19,555
$981.57
11
$388,090
$871.87
14.7
$76,506 $1,105.30
13.9
$77,127 $1,202.74
13.1
$13,679 $1,103.15
12.6
$129,042
$980.96
15.7
$89,064 $1,048.03
14.2
$17,347 $1,066.79
12.5
$13,388
$964.02
13.9
$221,758 $1,143.98
14.8
$85,065 $1,202.78
12.4
$48,641 $1,415.03
13.6
$40,569 $1,027.10
13.9
$41,665 $1,083.86
12
$37,458
$986.71
12.3
$16,976 $1,164.73
11.7
$109,181 $1,106.16
14.9
$135,233 $1,193.46
13.6
$155,599 $1,129.04
15.6
$109,628 $1,186.08
15.3

State

Total
Low-Income
Middle-Income Upper-Income
Mean
Percent
Amount (in (Under $49K)
($50K-$99K)
($100K and
Credit Per
of
000s)
(in 000s)
(in 000s)
above) (in 000s)
Return
Returns
MS
$158,477
$91,765
$47,514
$19,197
$993.84
12.8
MO
$371,291
$157,012
$142,508
$71,771 $1,089.52
12.7
MT
$54,206
$24,098
$20,729
$9,378 $1,048.34
11
NE
$146,884
$53,582
$65,391
$27,910 $1,212.35
14.3
NV
$150,652
$85,521
$45,863
$19,267
$888.82
13.6
NH
$103,799
$34,225
$40,623
$28,950 $1,249.47
12.6
NJ
$779,404
$324,124
$259,543
$195,738 $1,189.58
15.5
NM
$83,002
$41,865
$27,327
$13,810
$806.05
11.3
NY
$1,520,216
$721,142
$495,923
$303,151 $1,141.64
14.6
NC
$508,612
$231,646
$179,632
$97,335
$976.20
12.6
ND
$54,025
$21,487
$21,776
$10,761 $1,104.21
15.1
OH
$833,443
$336,768
$329,586
$167,089 $1,165.63
13.2
OK
$173,122
$79,269
$63,118
$30,735
$954.30
11.4
OR
$212,754
$94,429
$77,224
$41,101 $1,010.21
12.2
PA
$964,528
$367,437
$382,616
$214,475 $1,229.73
12.9
RI
$78,653
$32,019
$27,963
$18,672 $1,139.06
13.8
SC
$253,928
$123,317
$88,675
$41,937 $1,060.42
11.8
SD
$61,804
$25,846
$25,843
$10,116 $1,147.63
14
TN
$348,462
$176,725
$121,036
$50,702 $1,058.07
11.8
TX
$1,565,726
$812,481
$487,344
$265,900 $1,013.21
14.3
UT
$199,214
$100,835
$68,197
$30,183
$996.50
17.8
VT
$40,466
$13,341
$17,367
$9,757 $1,245.82
10.3
VA
$535,687
$219,927
$186,942
$128,818 $1,080.96
13.4
WA
$378,627
$148,332
$136,239
$94,056 $1,020.59
11.8
WV
$72,335
$29,677
$29,763
$12,894 $1,029.94
9
WI
$469,251
$159,132
$212,107
$98,012 $1,265.51
13.6
WY
$26,949
$12,314
$9,316
$5,319
$908.30
11
Note: Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income,
Copyright 2020 by IRS.

Table 5. TY 2015 (CY 2016) One Year after PATH of 2015 Implementation in Real 2017
Dollars
State

Total
Amount (in
000s)

Low-Income
(Under $49K)
(in 000s)

US
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO

$19,246,240
$325,557
$36,326
$336,951
$129,426
$2,029,670
$300,526

$9,428,830
$183,554
$17,314
$175,153
$65,349
$1,073,042
$136,890

MiddleIncome ($50K$99K) (in
000s)
$5,681,604
$86,603
$10,680
$100,464
$41,336
$561,512
$91,930

(table cont’d)
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Upper-Income
($100K and
above) (in 000s)
$4,135,806
$55,400
$8,333
$61,334
$22,742
$395,116
$71,706

Mean
Percent
Credit
of
Per
Returns
Return
$994.58
12.9
$1,020.56
15.5
$936.97
10.7
$914.81
12.7
$932.47
11.3
$868.42
13.2
$999.89
11.5

State

Total
Amount (in
000s)

Low-Income
(Under $49K)
(in 000s)

MiddleIncome ($50K$99K) (in
000s)

CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA

$242,847
$55,776
$1,380,580
$752,923
$74,889
$87,011
$890,749
$359,973
$186,438
$163,546
$205,426
$280,718
$68,914
$404,965
$449,998
$685,869
$372,340
$200,203
$326,844
$46,357
$110,808
$151,687
$87,777
$657,965
$86,928
$1,225,503
$541,745
$44,778
$711,646
$171,885
$193,668
$818,156
$67,237
$280,649
$53,079
$359,732
$1,634,077
$196,549
$33,779
$531,907

$99,607
$24,945
$893,865
$446,754
$30,854
$42,077
$410,804
$145,853
$66,364
$65,681
$88,334
$169,197
$26,905
$186,567
$188,170
$313,869
$139,571
$131,721
$147,177
$21,232
$42,815
$87,150
$31,265
$281,202
$44,877
$578,567
$267,627
$19,851
$307,435
$80,183
$92,850
$326,576
$29,332
$144,487
$21,078
$185,356
$878,984
$99,324
$12,300
$233,720

$72,547
$17,247
$320,176
$190,219
$24,994
$28,655
$265,370
$120,803
$67,705
$56,095
$70,988
$67,111
$24,823
$120,203
$132,610
$209,431
$122,851
$45,022
$105,524
$14,758
$37,848
$42,176
$28,655
$197,755
$26,153
$366,407
$162,330
$13,266
$230,095
$56,622
$58,709
$276,599
$20,178
$83,955
$19,205
$109,791
$454,419
$61,948
$12,102
$164,078

(table cont’d)
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Upper-Income
($100K and
above) (in 000s)

Mean
Percent
Credit Per
of
Return
Returns

$70,692 $1,085.40
$13,584 $1,026.24
$166,539
$956.07
$115,950 $1,013.06
$19,040 $1,019.17
$16,279
$925.75
$214,574 $1,051.71
$93,317 $1,038.82
$52,369 $1,046.87
$41,771
$958.20
$46,104
$994.03
$44,410
$986.50
$17,187 $1,039.90
$98,195 $1,019.16
$129,218 $1,095.26
$162,569 $1,061.65
$109,918 $1,070.71
$23,461
$971.77
$74,143
$978.08
$10,367
$940.10
$30,145
$956.89
$22,361
$930.14
$27,857 $1,113.92
$179,008 $1,098.48
$15,897
$814.84
$280,528 $1,055.29
$111,788
$963.07
$11,661 $1,006.47
$174,116 $1,063.48
$35,081
$926.56
$42,110
$945.37
$214,980 $1,126.94
$17,727 $1,053.87
$52,206 $1,018.32
$12,796 $1,060.53
$64,586 $1,015.88
$300,674
$954.29
$35,278
$940.65
$9,377 $1,122.96
$134,109 $1,033.67

12.7
12
15
16.7
10.7
13
13.7
11.2
12.2
12.7
10.8
14.2
10.3
13.4
12.1
13.7
12.8
16.6
12
10
12.9
12.1
11.4
13.7
11.6
12.1
12.6
12
12
11.3
10.9
11.7
12.1
12.7
12.1
11.9
14.1
16.5
9.2
13.2

State

WA
WV
WI
WY

Total
Amount (in
000s)

Low-Income
(Under $49K)
(in 000s)

MiddleIncome ($50K$99K) (in
000s)

$369,513
$67,679
$362,054
$21,246

$157,631
$27,327
$134,738
$9,072

$113,268
$24,676
$124,543
$6,889

Upper-Income
Mean Percent
($100K and Credit Per
of
above) (in 000s)
Return Returns

$98,615
$15,676
$102,773
$5,284

$956.84
$977.17
$1,056.57
$822.21

11.3
8.9
12.1
9.3

Note: Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income,
Copyright 2020 by IRS.

Table 6. TY 2016 (CY 2017) Latest IRS Data in Real 2017 Dollars
State

Total
Amount (in
000s)

Low-Income
(Under $49K)
(in 000s)

US
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ

$17,496,702
$280,470
$32,118
$317,768
$120,359
$1,825,384
$280,511
$229,898
$52,033
$1,193,534
$652,138
$67,498
$83,129
$801,301
$329,812
$173,653
$151,080
$190,352
$255,547
$63,516
$361,390
$421,852
$614,953
$348,385
$166,509
$300,299
$44,481
$102,547
$142,681
$81,771
$592,554

$8,351,763
$148,292
$15,221
$163,006
$59,013
$944,022
$127,482
$95,186
$23,552
$744,148
$371,016
$27,353
$39,278
$360,004
$130,253
$61,573
$59,892
$79,556
$149,265
$24,763
$163,908
$176,672
$272,687
$131,763
$102,226
$133,262
$20,489
$39,456
$80,154
$29,197
$248,435

MiddleIncome ($50K$99K) (in
000s)
$5,240,276
$79,156
$9,687
$95,306
$39,415
$509,732
$85,248
$69,265
$15,813
$292,694
$173,019
$22,288
$27,308
$241,888
$110,676
$61,756
$51,853
$66,269
$63,251
$22,473
$107,295
$123,812
$189,376
$111,847
$41,624
$97,295
$14,139
$34,926
$40,684
$26,727
$180,719

(table cont’d)
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Upper-Income
($100K and
above) (in 000s)
$3,904,663
$53,022
$7,210
$59,456
$21,931
$371,630
$67,781
$65,447
$12,668
$156,692
$108,103
$17,857
$16,543
$199,409
$88,883
$50,324
$39,335
$44,527
$43,031
$16,280
$90,187
$121,368
$152,890
$104,775
$22,659
$69,742
$9,853
$28,165
$21,843
$25,847
$163,400

Mean
Percent
Credit
of
Per
Returns
Return
$979.09
11.9
$997.33
13.8
$930.69
10
$903.39
11.9
$919.61
10.7
$854.44
12
$991.06
10.7
$1,070.99
12.2
$1,004.50
11.4
$932.30
13.2
$988.46
14.9
$1,007.88
9.8
$917.34
12.3
$1,035.14
12.7
$1,024.93
10.4
$1,030.40
11.6
$951.69
12
$986.23
10.1
$971.51
13.4
$1,017.07
9.6
$999.92
12.2
$1,081.09
11.4
$1,045.77
12.5
$1,060.27
12
$949.63
14.3
$966.21
11.2
$937.63
9.5
$948.10
12
$921.95
11.2
$1,088.39
10.8
$1,078.59
12.5

State

Total
Amount (in
000s)

Low-Income
(Under $49K)
(in 000s)

MiddleUpper-Income
Mean
Percent
Income ($50K($100K and
Credit Per
of
$99K) (in
above) (in 000s)
Return
Returns
000s)
NM
$79,817
$40,576
$24,449
$14,792
$808.93
10.9
NY
$1,113,849
$516,571
$336,304
$260,974 $1,040.91
11.2
NC
$498,311
$236,815
$152,751
$108,745
$953.21
11.6
ND
$41,900
$18,353
$12,514
$11,033 $1,002.63
11.6
OH
$644,676
$271,249
$210,401
$163,026 $1,048.02
11
OK
$161,184
$73,349
$54,065
$33,770
$918.01
10.9
OR
$181,222
$86,744
$54,260
$40,218
$930.73
10.3
PA
$752,759
$297,307
$253,490
$201,962 $1,107.83
11
RI
$62,762
$27,588
$18,625
$16,549 $1,041.17
11.4
SC
$263,605
$132,726
$79,073
$51,806 $1,007.20
11.9
SD
$48,973
$19,027
$17,605
$12,341 $1,043.53
11.3
NY
$1,113,849
$516,571
$336,304
$260,974 $1,040.91
11.2
NC
$498,311
$236,815
$152,751
$108,745
$953.21
11.6
ND
$41,900
$18,353
$12,514
$11,033 $1,002.63
11.6
OH
$644,676
$271,249
$210,401
$163,026 $1,048.02
11
OK
$161,184
$73,349
$54,065
$33,770
$918.01
10.9
OR
$181,222
$86,744
$54,260
$40,218
$930.73
10.3
PA
$752,759
$297,307
$253,490
$201,962 $1,107.83
11
RI
$62,762
$27,588
$18,625
$16,549 $1,041.17
11.4
SC
$263,605
$132,726
$79,073
$51,806 $1,007.20
11.9
SD
$48,973
$19,027
$17,605
$12,341 $1,043.53
11.3
TN
$328,698
$165,329
$101,864
$61,505
$995.57
11
TX
$1,495,968
$777,588
$429,811
$288,569
$936.88
13.2
UT
$194,956
$99,447
$60,465
$35,044
$938.69
16.1
VT
$31,287
$11,286
$11,271
$8,730 $1,100.11
8.7
VA
$485,805
$210,341
$149,735
$125,729 $1,020.34
12.2
WA
$347,647
$147,801
$105,390
$94,456
$937.53
10.6
WV
$63,925
$25,891
$23,212
$14,822
$976.70
8.5
WI
$334,646
$123,190
$113,399
$98,057 $1,042.06
11.3
WY
$20,804
$9,064
$6,765
$4,975
$848.10
9.1
Note: Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income,
Copyright 2020 by IRS.

During Tax Year 1998, Americans received $5.1 billion in tax credits with a mean credit
of $1,072.28 per capita. Populations with incomes over $100,000 received less than 1% of the
tax credit distribution, with almost an equivalent 50/50 split between low- and middle-income
levels. By Tax Year 2009, more than ten years later, Americans received $21 billion in tax
credits, with a mean credit of $1,063.31 per capita. Populations with incomes over $100,000
received a larger portion of the tax credit distribution, totaling 19%. Middle-income populations
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received far less than in the past with 34% of the total proportion, while lower income
populations only slightly dropped to 46%. Uncharacteristically, Tax Years 2015 and 2016 show
a drop in total tax credit allocations, along with percent of returns claiming tax credits, with
Americans receiving $19 and $17 billion, respectively, with a mean credit of around $986.84 per
capita. However, as tax credit allocations decreased, the proportion provided to incomes above
$100,000 increased to 22%, while middle income populations received less than ever before with
30%. Notably, the lower income levels (which encapsulate incomes between $0 and $49,000)
have remained at a steadfast 48%-50% of the tax credit share.
My first hypothesis claimed that states vary considerably in the distribution of federal
education tax credits, and the distribution of tax rewards were skewed towards those with higher
incomes. It is clear that the upper income populations (over $100,000) are receiving a larger
proportion of tax credits over time; furthermore, the middle-income populations are also seeing a
negative skew in tax credit distributions to make way for the increase in upper-income
collections. Upon reviewing the statewide distributions, states with the largest and smallest
populations seemed to correspond with total tax credit allocations, but Pennsylvania and New
Mexico continuously had the highest and lowest mean credit per return over the four time
periods reviewed. Utah and West Virginia also predominantly held the highest and lowest
percent of returns filing for tax credits. In Tax Year 1998, Georgia received the lowest percent
(2.5%) of returns filing for tax credits, yet in 2015, Georgia received the highest percent (16.7%).
This quick change in tax credit receipts in Georgia may have been caused by policy changes in
the HOPE scholarship for Academic Year 2011-2012. Before 2011, the HOPE scholarship
covered 100% tuition with some additional scholarships for fees and books; however, with
dwindling lottery revenue, the state legislature agreed to lower the scholarship based on annual
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lottery revenue and eliminated scholarships for fees and books (Turner, 2011). This anecdotal
evidence may have some grounding in my final hypothesis, that states with large financial aid
programs lose out on tax credit receipts due to the interactive and cancelling nature of the two
programs.
Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 provide information on tax liability and percent of tax liability
covered by tax credits per income range. These tables provide a quick look at who has benefitted
the most from tax credits as tax credits encompass not just tax refunds but also tax deductions
dependent on income range and tax bracket. During Tax Year 1998, total tax credit claims were
low as eligibility for tax credits was restricted to income ranges that had some form of tax
liability, or amount a taxpayer owes to the federal government. Furthermore, income ranges
above $116,000 were ineligible at this time. However, total tax education tax credit claims in
Tax Year 2009, with the implementation of the expanded AOTC to lower and upper income
populations, increased abruptly, and the percent of tax liability covered by available tax credits
increased in all income ranges.
Table 7. Tax Liability Covered By Credits per Income Group for TY 1998 in Real 2017 Dollars
All Returns
Low-Income
Middle-Income Upper-Income
(Under $49K)
($50K-$99K)
($100K and
(in 000s)
(in 000s)
above) (in 000s)
$301,919,942
$218,113,688
Total Taxable $ 1,213,247,324 $219,147,942
Liability
$5,130,658
$2,608,027
$2,519,134
$3,496
Total
Education Tax
Credits
1.19%
0.83%
0.0016%
% of Liability 0.42%
Covered by
Credits
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Table 8. Tax Liability Covered by Credits per Income Group for TY 2009 in Real 2017 Dollars
All Returns
Low-Income
Middle-Income Upper-Income
(Under $49K)
($50K-$99K)
($100K and
(in 000s)
(in 000s)
above) (in 000s)
$1,088,829,102
$107,026,832
$213,376,982
$261,336,807
Total Taxable
Liability
$20,731,697
$9,618,541
$7,152,047
$3,961,108
Total
Education Tax
Credits
1.90%
8.99%
3.35%
1.52%
% of Liability
Covered by
Credits

Upper-income populations exhibited the largest percentage increase of tax credit liability
covered by credits, by 95,000%, lower-income populations increased by 655%, and middleincome populations increased by 303%. Although tax refunds were now allocated to low-income
households, total tax credit benefits seemed to pass on to the upper-income populations via tax
deductions at a higher rate. As can be seen with the leveling off in national and state level tax
credit receipts, Tax Year 2015 showed a decrease in the percent of tax liability covered by tax
credits mostly for the middle class with a percentage decrease of 26%. Upper-income and lowerincome populations remained relatively stable, with a slight decrease in upper-income coverage
of tax liability by tax credits.
Table 9. Tax Liability Covered by Credits per Income Group for TY 2015 in Real 2017 Dollars
All Returns
Low-Income
Middle-Income Upper-Income
(Under $49K)
($50K-$99K)
($100K and
(in 000s)
(in 000s)
above) (in 000s)
$1,566,865,109
$104,672,696
$227,916,995
$336,346,195
Total Taxable
Liability
$19,246,240
$9,428,830
$5,681,604
$4,135,806
Total
Education Tax
Credits
1.22%
9.00%
2.49%
1.23%
% of Liability
Covered by
Credits
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The next tables, Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 identify the highest and lowest ranked states by
percent of returns per time period (Tax Years 1998, 2009, 2015, 2016) by several key variables
that affect tax credit take-up. These variables, delineated by state, include total tax credit
receipts, overall population, the population enrolled in college, median household income,
average tuition and fees in-state, and unemployment rates.
Table 10. Tax Liability Covered by Credits per Income Group for TY 2016 in Real 2017 Dollars
All Returns
Low-Income
Middle-Income Upper-Income
(Under $49K)
($50K-$99K)
($100K and
(in 000s)
(in 000s)
above) (in 000s)
$1,517,276,636
$92,843,854
$224,538,599
$336,375,570
Total Taxable
Liability
$17,517,572
$8,373,491
$5,236,618
$3,907,464
Total
Education Tax
Credits
1.15%
9.02%
2.33%
1.16%
% of Liability
Covered by
Credits

Table 11. Ranked States’ Indicator Variables Affecting Tax Credits for TY 1998 in Real 2017
Dollars
State
Population College
Avg.
Avg.
Median
Unemployment
Pop
Tuition
State
Family
Rate
and Fee
Grant
Income
Award
Highest
Ranked
Utah
2,129,836
222,256
$6,549
$1,033 $69,621
3.7%
Iowa
2,869,413
349,824
$12,719
$2,227 $62,134
2.5%
Nebraska
1,666,028
136,258
$9,562
$971
$58,397
2.9%
North
633,666
54,492
$4,844
$1,237 $49,382
3.4%
Dakota
South
733,133
51,702
$8,191
$470
$54,167
2.9%
Dakota
Lowest
Ranked
Georgia
7,788,240
398,537
$6,787
$1,953 $59,605
4.0%
Mississippi
2,768,619
169,211
$4,543
$795
$49,102
5.1%
Florida
15,111,244 984,271
$8,785
$1,337 $54,171
3.9%
Arkansas
2,551,373
165,991
$4,256
$1,717 $44,875
4.5%
Louisiana
4,372,035
216,775
$3,974
$1,195 $49,368
5.1%
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Table 12. Ranked States’ Indicator Variables Affecting Tax Credits for TY 2009 in Real 2017
Dollars
State
Population College
Avg.
Avg.
Median
Unemployment
Pop
Tuition
State
Family
Rate
and Fee
Grant
Income
Award
Highest
Ranked
Utah
2,775,334 255,653
$13,555
$3,042 $65,443
8.2%
Florida
18,845,785 1,023,557 $13,788
$2,749 $50,860
11.1%
Michigan
9,877,535 648,533
$13,525
$3,448 $53,411
12.2%
New Jersey
8,799,624 442,887
$15,695
$5,227 $72,677
9.3%
Minnesota
5,310,843 424,467
$15,687
$2,674 $60,388
7.3%
Lowest
Ranked
West
1,854,214 135,118
$10,082
$3,582 $49,372
9.0%
Virginia
Vermont
625,880
44,769
$25,537
$2,728 $64,551
6.2%
Arkansas
2,921,978 169,068
$8,530
$2,582 $44,536
8.6%
Wyoming
564,483
36,873
$3,557
$3,449 $60,249
6.6%
Montana
990,722
50,472
$6,942
$1,889 $47,645
7.7%
Table 13. Ranked States’ Indicator Variables Affecting Tax Credits for TY 2015 in Real 2017
Dollars
State
Population College Pop Avg.
Avg.
Median
Unemployment
Tuition
State
Family
Rate
and Fee
Grant
Income
Award
Highest
Ranked
Georgia
10,304,763 530,711
$12,357
$3,143 $56,011
5.4%
Mississippi
2,988,298 174,183
$8,492
$1,545 $43,006
5.7%
Utah
3,042,613 292,995
$12,818
$3,075 $70,613
3.6%
Alabama
4,864,745 302,959
$10,812
$2,133 $49,412
6.0%
Florida
20,629,982 1,083,570
$14,452
$2,450 $53,551
4.9%
Lowest
Ranked
West
1,830,929 150,897
$10,890
$3,003 $46,412
6.1%
Virginia
Vermont
623,644
43,865
$29,506
$2,755 $63,660
3.3%
Wyoming
584,290
34,205
$4,904
$2,780 $60,513
5.4%
Montana
1,040,863 50,799
$7,733
$2,772 $59,724
4.2%
Maine
1,331,370 71,719
$18,171
$1,720 $53,216
3.9%
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Table 14. Ranked States’ Indicator Variables Affecting Tax Credits for TY 2016 in Real 2017
Dollars
State
Population College
Avg.
Avg.
Median
Unemployment
Pop
Tuition
State
Family
Rate
and Fee
Grant
Income
Award
Highest
Ranked
Utah
3,103,118 311,534
$12,625
$2,197 $71,490
3.4%
Georgia
10,413,055 532,907
$12,123
$3,078 $59,398
4.7%
Mississippi
2,989,663 172,712
$8,354
$1,528 $44,336
5.1%
Alabama
4,875,120 304,052
$10,495
$2,275 $52,105
4.3%
Louisiana
4,670,818 239,287
$11,268
$2,875 $44,627
5.1%
Lowest
Ranked
West
1,817,048 146,358
$10,998
$2,863 $48,102
5.2%
Virginia
Vermont
624,525
44,719
$29,756
$2,250 $65,234
3.1%
Wyoming
578,934
33,365
$4,925
$2,668 $60,987
4.3%
Montana
1,053,090 50,916
$7,886
$2,310 $58,806
4.0%
Maine
1,335,063 72,116
$18,286
$1,785 $54,616
3.3%

To identify highly correlational variables and to guide the next research questions, I
utilized a simple correlation matrix, utilizing Pearson r for continuous variables over seven
variables with 40 observations in each. The results in Table 15 indicated a preliminary positive
relationship between the total tax credit amount per state and overall state population - as was
expected. The greater the population in a state, the higher the likelihood of the state receiving
larger amounts of tax credits. The amount of students enrolled in postsecondary institutions per
state also had a high positive relationship with total tax credit receipts, r(40) = 0.85, p < .001.
This correlation suggests that states with higher enrollment rates received larger amounts of tax
credits as should be expected; tax credits are only eligible for students enrolled in postsecondary
education. Although average, in-state tuition and fees and median household income did not
seem to show a significant relationship with percent returns or total tax credit receipts, the
unemployment rate per state in a given year seemed to correlate moderately with the total
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amount of tax credits received and the percent of returns eligible for tax credits, which again,
demonstrates the closest measure to per capita tax credit receipt. Furthermore, states with high
unemployment had a moderately positive relationship with higher average state aid awards. Of
most interest, however, are the correlational results between average state aid awards per student
and the percent of returns eligible for tax credits, r(40) = 0.57, p < .001. Incidentally, it seems the
relationship between the average in-state tuition and fees and total tax credit receipt per state is
mostly arbitrary.
Overall, state residents seem to utilize tax credit policies more frequently when the state
has high population count, high postsecondary enrollment, higher unemployment rates, and
higher average state aid awards. These preliminary, correlational results suggest that states with
large aid programs may be excluded from maximum tax credit dollars even though they may
have more returns eligible for tax credits. Although increased tax credit filing may indicate larger
tax credit allocations per state, this may not be the case as taxpayers may not be receiving the
maximum tax credit award. Therefore, it is conducive to proceed with more robust tests to isolate
the effects of state aid programs on tax credit allocations.
State and Institutional Response to Education Tax Credits
Hypothesis 2: States have responded to increased federal education tax credits via
decreased funding to higher education. Institutions have also increased tuition and fees
to capture the supplementary income provided by federal education tax credits.
Prior to analysis of the second hypothesis, several steps were taken to ensure data met
basic assumptions of linear regression. These steps included accuracy of data collection and
entry, removal of missing values, and fit. Several institutions were removed from the original
data collection because of attrition over the time span involved in the analysis. Only institutions
with data for 16 years were kept in the analysis to keep the data balanced. To remove any
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outliers the dependent and independent variables were screened by standardizing scores and
eliminating z scores below ±3. Using standardized or studentized residuals makes little
difference when using large samples (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013). Any institutions that were
eliminated for a singular year due to outliers were also removed entirely from the analysis. This
dropped the total sample slightly in each sector. For Model 1 (Public, Four-Year) and Model 2
(Public, Two-Year), the dependent variable, state appropriations per FTE, remained right
skewed after removal of outliers — albeit less so; therefore, the variable was transformed
logarithmically (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013). For Model 3 (Private Sector), Model 4 (Public,
Two-Year), and Model 5 (Public, Four-Year), the dependent variable, published tuition and fees,
remained normal; therefore, no transformations were necessary. Tables 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20
detail the descriptive statistics for the second hypothesis and the five models estimated.
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Table 15. Correlation Coefficients for Highest and Lowest Ranked States per Percent of Returns
TOTAL
PR
POP
COLLEGE
COSTS
MEDINC
TOTAL
1.000
Total Tax Credits Per
State
PR
0.571**
1.000
Percent of Returns
POP
0.889**
0.289
1.000
Overall State
Population
COLLEGE
0.846**
0.284
0.977**
1.000
Population Enrolled
COSTS
0.168
0.294
0.047
0.053
1.000
Average In-state
Tuition and Fee
MEDINC
0.007
0.143
-0.064
0.000
0.369
1.000
Median Household
Income
STATE
0.390*
0.572**
0.190
0.167
0.286
0.317*
Average State Aid Per
Student
UNEMP
0.506**
0.458**
0.344**
0.327**
-0.013
-0.189
Unemployment Rate
*Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01. ** Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001.
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STATE

UNEMP

1.000

0.557**

1.000

Table 16. Descriptive Statistics Model 1: Public, Four-Year Sector (N = 515) (Obs = 8,240)
Variable
Mean or %
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
State Appropriations per FTE
Log State Appropriations per FTE
Average In-State Net Price
Annual Median Household Income
Per State
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State
Population Per State
Unemployment Rate Per State

$6,956.17
8.6
$4,241.04
$58,485.59

5957.87
0.582
2,492.11
8694.46

$0
4.1
-$10,762.87
$34,916

$84,774.72
11.3
$13,036.13
$84,970

632,639.7
10,300,283
6.1%

635,057.9
9,508,742
1.93

27,872
500,017
2.4%

2,776,162
39,399,349
14.4%

Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

6.0%
12.2%
13.8%
10.3%
17.9%
7.6%
14.2%
8.0%
10.1%

Treatment Group
Low-priced Institutions

3,903
(47.4%)

Control Group
High-priced Institutions

4,337
(52.6%)

Table 17. Descriptive Statistics Model 2: Public, Two-Year Sector (N = 774) (Obs = 12,384)
Variable
Mean or %
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
State Appropriations per FTE
Log State Appropriations per FTE
Average In-State Net Price
Annual Median Household Income
Per State
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State
Population Per State

$3,930.55
7.9
$1,696.86
$58,208.28

5255.60
0.757
2,074.84
8828.71

$0.49
-0.71
-$6,360.85
$34,916

$182,667
12.1
$9,286.12
$84,970

650,208.5
10,462,987

668,805.4
9,831,389

32,641
500,017

2,776,162
39,399,349

Unemployment Rate Per State

6.2%

1.98

2.4%

14.4%

(table cont’d)
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Variable

Mean or %

Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

5.2%
9.0%
12.0%
12.1%
20.2%
10.0%
13.8%
6.2%
11.5%

Treatment Group
Low-priced Institutions

10,853
(87.6%)

Control Group
High-priced Institutions

1,531
(12.4%)

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Table 18. Descriptive Statistics Model 3: Private Sector (N = 1,597) (Obs = 25,552)
Variable
Mean or %
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Published Tuition & Fees
Annual Median Household Income
Per State
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State
Population Per State
Unemployment Rate Per State
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

$22,717.8
$59,487.12

11,375.58
7,660.13

$107.58
$34,916

$61,897.05
$84,970

738,314.7
11,866,683
6.2%

647,480.3
9,448,170
1.9

27,872
615,442
2.4%

2,776,162
39,399,349
14.4%

8.5%
21.1%
17.6%
11.8%
15.2%
6.3%
5.8%
3.3%
10.6%

(table cont’d)
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Variable

Mean or %

Treatment Group
Low-priced Institutions

862
(3.4%)
24,690
(96.6%)

Control Group
High-priced Institutions

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Table 19. Descriptive Statistics Model 4: Public, Two-Year Sector (N = 774) (Obs = 12,384)
Variable
Mean or %
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Published Tuition & Fees
Annual Median Household Income
Per State
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State
Population Per State
Unemployment Rate Per State

$3,676.13
$58,208.28

1852.61
8828.71

$65.47
$34,916

$14,641.18
$84,970

650,208.5
10,462,987
6.2%

668,805.4
9,831,389
1.98

32,641
500,017
2.4%

2,776,162
39,399,349
14.4%

Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

5.2%
9.0%
12.0%
12.1%
20.2%
10.0%
13.8%
6.2%
11.5%

Treatment Group
Low-priced Institutions

10,853
(87.6%)

Control Group
High-priced Institutions

1,531
(12.4%)

Reviewing the parallel lines between the control and treatment groups (high net price vs.
low net price institutions) in the public sector, state appropriations rose and fell consistently
between each group at similar times. For four-year, public institutions in Figure 7, the time
period between TY 2008- TY 2009 indicated a spike in state appropriations for low-priced
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Table 20. Descriptive Statistics Model 5: Public, Four-Year Sector (N = 515) (Obs = 8,240)
Variable
Mean or %
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Published Tuition & Fees
Annual Median Household Income
Per State
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State
Population Per State
Unemployment Rate Per State

$7,408.13
$58,485.59

2526.05
8694.46

$195.83
$34,916

$20,713.03
$84,970

632,639.7
10,300,283
6.1%

635,057.9
9,508,742
1.93

27,872
500,017
2.4%

2,776,162
39,399,349
14.4%

Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

6.0%
12.2%
13.8%
10.3%
17.9%
7.6%
14.2%
8.0%
10.1%

Treatment Group
Low-priced Institutions

3,903
(47.4%)

Control Group
High-priced Institutions

4,337
(52.6%)

institutions more so than their counterparts; however, after the economic recession of 2008, both
groups received drastically lower state appropriations, which corresponds with several reports on
state spending (Leachman, Masterson & Figueroa, 2017; Pew, 2020). Interestingly, Figure 8
indicates low-priced, two-year institutions received higher state appropriations than their
counterparts did consistently over the years; though, budget cuts and budget growth were felt
similarly between the two groups.
Additionally, the private sector parallel lines graph in Figure 9 shows duplicative patterns
between the two groups; however, the average mean in published tuition and fees between the
groups are much different between private institutions who receive larger state grants to
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subsidize costs and those institutions with little subsidization. Figure 10 indicates the parallel
lines graph between low- and high-priced public, two-year institutions, which mimics the private
sector except for the intensity of the average means for the public sector. This corresponds with
the lower published tuition and fees in the public sector. Furthermore and of note, the parallel
lines graph of the public, four-year institutions in Figure 11 roughly indicates that after the policy
shock, lower-priced institutions increased published tuition and fees at a higher rate than their

8.5

8.6

Mean
8.7

8.8

8.9
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year
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treatment

Figure 7. Parallel lines between public, four-year institutions and state appropriations (high v. low-price).
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Figure 8. Parallel lines between public, two-year institutions and state appropriations (high v. low price).
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Figure 9. Parallel lines between private institutions and published tuition and fees (high v. low-price).
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Figure 10. Parallel lines between public, two-year institutions and published tuition and fees (high v. lowprice).
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Figure 11. Parallel lines between public, four-year institutions and published tuition and fees (high v. lowprice).

Table 21 displays results of the first and second model analyzing the public sector and
state appropriations. The coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses, indicate the
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unconditional expected means of the logarithmic value of state appropriations. Each of the five
models to follow include controls for year and time fixed effect, state economic values, and
region. The first and second model analyze whether state appropriations decreased after the
introduction of the American Opportunity Tax Credit for low-priced institutions. The intuition
behind this analysis is that states may seek to supplant their budgets with federal dollars due to
taxpayer eligibility of tax credit programs. The analysis indicates that after the policy shock in
2009, high-priced, public, two-year institutions received 11.7%, exp(0.111), more state
appropriations than before the policy shock. Simultaneously, low-priced institutions received
3.9% less, exp(-0.151) after the policy shock. The negative coefficient for the differential effect
for two-year institutions indicates that the change in the baseline mean for institutions with lower
prices (<$4,000 average net price) was lower than the change in baseline means for high-priced
institutions, by 14%. In other words, states reduced funding at a higher percentage for lowpriced, two-year colleges after the policy implementation. The opposite was found for public,
four-year colleges, where high-priced institutions received 16.8% less, exp(-0.184), after the
shock, and low-priced institutions received 9.3% less, exp(-0.098) afterwards. The positive
coefficient for the differential effect for four-year institutions indicates that the change in the
baseline mean for institutions with lower prices (<$4,000 average net price) was higher than the
change in baseline means for high-priced institutions, by 8.9% or exp(0.0858). States seemed to
increase appropriations to lower-priced, four-year institutions more so than higher-priced
institutions. All models are statistically significant at the 95% or 99% level not only for prepolicy shock effects but also for the treatment effect, indicating effective interventions.
As for the control variables, region and unemployment rate — all aspects of the
economic landscape in which higher education resides — are significant for two-year
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institutions. For every percent increase in the unemployment rate of the area where the two-year,
public institution resides, state appropriations decrease by 5.8%. For Model 1, state
appropriations are varied among regions within statistically significant indicators for five out of
the nine regions. The East North Central States (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin) received an average of 56%, exp(-0.83), less appropriations than the baseline level
(New England States: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont). The West South Central States (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) received
an average of 29%, exp(-0.34), less appropriations than the New England States. While there is
much variation in state appropriations to two-year, public institutions, it is interesting to note that
all the regions’ institutions received less state appropriations than the New England States.
Model 2 only had one statistically significant regional difference — the East North Central States
as in the first model. However, state appropriations decreased 21% more than the New England
States. This seems to indicate that state appropriations tend to be cut for two-year institutions
more so than four-year institutions. This rationale coincides with the results in the DD
estimation.
Although annual household income levels are significant for this model, the
exponentiated value (0.00001) equates to 0. The only control variable that seems to impact the
public, four-year institutions is the area’s unemployment rate, which indicates that for every
percent increase in unemployment, state appropriations decrease by 1.4%. Although state
population and postsecondary enrollment per state were included as control variables, their
overall impact in the model is negligible and insignificant. Furthermore, both models’ R2 are
small; however, in the human fields of science - sociology, psychology, education, etc.- this is to
be expected and does not negate the impact of the results and conclusions about the outcome
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variable. These R2 values are similar to Long’s (2004) analysis, in which both of her DD
estimations included R2 values of 0.19 and 0.05, respectively.
Table 21. Tax Credit Effect on State Appropriations in the Public Sector
Dependent Variable: Log(State Appropriations)
(1)
Public Two-Year

95%
Confidence
Intervals

(2)
Public FourYear

95% Confidence
Intervals

0.111**
(0.0478)

(0.017, 0.205)

-0.184***
(0.024)

(-0.233, -0.136)

Low-Priced
Institutions
After Intervention

-0.04**
(0.021)

(-0.081, 0.00001)

-0.098***
(0.028)

(-0.154, -0.043)

Differential Effect
(DD estimator)

-0.151**
(0.052)

(-0.253, -0.048)

0.0858**
(0.039)

(0.009, 0.126)

Base (0)
-0.66***
(0.10)
-0.83***
(0.11)
-0.46***
(0.10)
-0.11
(0.10)
-0.18
(0.11)
-0.34**
(0.13)
-0.43**
(0.13)
-0.18
(0.09)

-(-0.86, -0.46)

Base (0)
0.05
(0.134)
-0.23**
(0.11)
-0.05
(0.11)
0.14
(0.12)
0.09
(0.13)
0.05
(0.14)
0.02
(0.17)
0.04
(0.14)

-(-0.22, 0.31)

High-Priced
Institutions
After Intervention

Control Variables
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Unemployment Rate
Annual Household
Income
Postsecondary
Enrollment

-0.6***
(61.6)
0.00001***
(0.000002)
0

(-1.04, -0.62)
(-0.66, -0.26)
(-0.30, 0.03)
(-0.4, 0.03)
(-0.6, -0.09)
(-0.69, -0.18)
(-0.37, 0.007)

(-0.07, -0.05)
(-0.00002, 0.00006)

-0.014**
(0.007)
0
0
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(-0.46, -0.007)
(-0.3, 0.2)
(-0.10, 0.38)
(-0.17, 0.36)
(-0.23, 0.33)
(-0.31, 0.34)
(-0.24, 0.32)

(-0.03, -0.0004)

(1)
Public Two-Year
State Population

95%
Confidence
Intervals

0

(2)
Public Four-Year

95%
Confidence
Intervals

0

Number of Colleges
774
515
Observations
12,384
8059
R-squared
0.20
0.08
***Statistically Significant at 1% level. **Statistically Significant at 5% level.
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Monetary values in real 2017 dollars.

Tables 22 and 23 indicate a much more convenient way to showcase the DD results. The
Difference-in-Differences Tables display the coefficients for the pre- and post-time periods for
both the control and treatment groups along with their differences in each segment. The last row
in the first column indicates the differences in the high- and low-priced institutions before 2009,
and the last row in the second column indicates the differences in the high- and low-priced
institutions after 2009. The last row in the last column indicates the difference of the differences
for both time and group, thus presenting an estimate of the overall impact of the intervention.
Table 22. Difference-in-Differences Table: State Appropriations at Public, Two-Year Institutions
Before and After the ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (High-Priced
7.76
7.87
0.111
Institutions)
Treatment (Low8.03
7.99
-0.04
Priced Institutions)
Change in Mean Log
0.273
0.202
-0.151
State Appropriations

Table 24 displays the results from the third, fourth, and fifth models analyzing the
institutional sectors and their respective published tuition and fees, with robust standard errors in
parentheses. This test identified whether published tuition and fees increased at low-priced
institutions as compared to high-priced institutions before and after the introduction of the
AOTC. To reiterate, low-price was determined by subtracting the average, state grant aid
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Table 23. Difference-in-Differences Table: State Appropriations at Public, Four-Year Institutions
Before and After the ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (High-Priced
8.840
8.655
-0.184
Institutions)
Treatment (Low8.682
8.584
-0.0985
Priced Institutions)
Change in Mean Log
-0.157
-0.0712
0.0858
State Appropriations

awarded per institution by published tuition and fees (not including books, room and board, and
other institutional expenses). All sectors received state grant aid; however, the public sector only
received state appropriations. The intuition behind this analysis is that institutions themselves
may seek to increase their budgets via increased published tuition and fees due to the universal
benefits of education tax credits to most income levels. If published tuition and fees increase
above the tax credit eligibility threshold (>$4,000), taxpayers could receive more of a benefit
from the tax credits — a kind of supplanting similarly theorized for state budgets.
Model 3 analyzed the private sector, both for-profit and not-for-profit institutions preand post-AOTC implementation, and the results indicate that low-priced institutions increased
published tuition and fees at a higher rate after the policy shock than high-priced institutions in
this sector, a 28% and 18% increase respectively. These results show an appreciable baseline
difference between the groups after the intervention (AOTC), suggesting that the policy shock
caused institutions to increase published tuition and fees regardless of whether taxpayers could
capture more education tax credits or not. The results for Models 4 and 5 for the public sector
(two- and four-year institutions) indicate that the both high- and low-priced institutions increased
published tuition and fees after the policy shock; however, low-priced institutions in both the
public, two-year sector and public, four-year sector increased their pricing at a much higher rate
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than their high-priced counterparts. Two-year, low-priced institutions increased by 23% after the
policy shock, whereas high-priced counterparts increased by only 5.8%. Four-year, low-priced
institutions increased by a 35%, whereas their high-priced counterparts increased by 18.4% after
the shock.
As for the control variables, region and annual household income — all aspects of the
economic landscape that higher education resides — are significant for the private sector and for
both public, two-year and four-year institutions. Unemployment rates are significant for both
two-year and four-year, public institutions. For every percent increase in the unemployment rate
of the area where two-year, public institution reside, published tuition and fees increase by $44
and by $106 for public, four-year institutions. Although annual household income levels are
significant for this model just as in the previous models, the values are negligible. As in the prior
models, state population and postsecondary enrollment per state were included as control
variables; however, their overall impact was negligible and insignificant. It is interesting to note
that the R2 values for the public sector in this analysis are much larger than in the previous model
— indicating that these two models fit the data very well. The lower R2 for the private sector may
be caused by the combination of for-profit and not-for-profit institutions, which was necessary as
the binary split for the treatment and control group for for-profits was non-existent.
Region is an interesting control variable that shows the differential published tuition and
fees. In Model 3, all of the regions’ private institutions charge less than the New England States
(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont), which is
indicative of the expensive private schools within that area. Interestingly, the Pacific States
(Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington) are the most similar to the baseline value
(New England States) than the rest of the regions when comparing private institutions’ published
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tuition and fees across the nation. However, the Pacific States are known for their high cost of
living and high tuition and fees in the private sector.
For Model 2, two-year, public institutions vary considerably and significantly across the
regions. For example, the Middle Atlantic States (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania)
have average published tuition and fee amounts that are $1,174.5 more than the baseline level
(New England States). However, the Mountain States (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico,
Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming) have average published tuition and fee amounts that are
$1,301.7 less than the New England States. For Model 3, only the East North Central States and
Mountain States are statistically significant. For public, four-year institutions in Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, the average published tuition and fee amount is $1,126.6 more
than New England States, and the Mountain States (mentioned above) have much lower average
published tuition and fees, $1,033.2 less than the New England States.
Tables 12, 13, and 14 detail the DD results. The Difference-in-Differences Tables display
the coefficients for the pre- and post-time periods for both the control and treatment groups along
with their differences in each segment. The last row in the first column indicates the differences
in the high- and low-priced institutions before 2009, and the last row in the second column
indicates the differences in the high- and low-priced institutions after 2009. The last row in the
last column indicates the difference of the differences for both time and group, thus presenting an
estimate of the overall impact of the intervention.
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Table 24. Tax Credit Effect on Published Tuition and Fees per Sector
Dependent Variable: Published Tuition and Fees
(3)
Private
Sector

95%
Confidence
Intervals

(4)
Public, 2Year

95%
Confidence
Intervals

(5)
Public, 4Year

95%
Confidence
Intervals

High-Priced
Institutions
After Intervention

$3,835.55***
(136.70)

(3567.41,
4103.68)

$330.34***
(120.07)

(94.64,
566.04)

$1,418.13*
**
(80.54)

(1259.91,
1576.35)

Low-Priced
Institutions
After Intervention

$1,491.97**
(489.16)

(532.49,
2451.44)

$606.03***
(31.85)

(543.52,
668.55)

$1,883.69*
**
(120.54)

(1646.87,
2120.51)

Differential Effect
(DD estimator)

-2,343.58***
(501.13)

(-3326.51,
-1360.64)

275.70**
(119.40)

(41.32,
510.07)

465.56**
(154.27)

(162.49,
768.63)

Base (0)
-5,086.9***
(1,280.4)
-5,924.6***
(1,199.03)
-8,362.7***
(1,182.7)
-6,681.4***
(1,301.6)
-8,483.5***
(1,473.7)
-8,315.6***
(1,559.6)
-8,869.7***
(1,632.4)

-(-7,598.3, 2,575.5)
(-8,276.4, 3,572.7)
(-10,682.4,
-6,042.9)
(-9,234.3, 4,128.5)
(-1,1374.8,
-5,592.9)
(-11,374.8,
-5,256.6)
(-12,071.6,
-5,667.8)

Base (0)
1,174.5***
(175.8)
826.3***
(162.04)
-14.2
(123.4)
-646.3***
(130.8)
-840***
(230.4)
-572.4**
(210.7)
-1,301.7***
(190)

-(829.5,
1,519.5)
(508.2,
1,144.4)
-256.3,
228)
(-903.1, 389.4)
(-1,292.3, 387.6)
(-986, 158.9)
(-1,674.5, 928.9)

Base (0)
601.1
(423.2)
1,126.6**
(404.5)
-368.04
(407.8)
519.8
(435.7)
571.1
(423.8)
329.6
(428.9)
-1,033.2**
(394.3)

-(-230.3,
1,432.5)
(331.9,
1,921.2)
(-1,169.3,
433.2)
(-336.2,
1,375.7)
(-261.5,
1,403.7)
(-512.9,
1,172.1)
(-1,807.9, 258.5)

-4,070.8**
(1,524.4)
57.29
(61.6)
0.2***
(0.04)
0.003
(0.002)
0

(-7,060.8, 1,080.8)
(-63.5,
178.1)
(0.11,
0.27)
(-0.001,
0.006)

-826.4***
(186.5)
44***
(12.9)
0.03***
(0.005)
0

(-1,192.6, 460.2)
(18.6, 69.4)

-123.9
(451.5)
105.9**
(24.63)
0.08***
(0.12)
0.00

(-1,010.9,
763.1)
(57.5,
154.3)
(21.1,
109.8)

Control Variables
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain

Pacific
Unemployment Rate
Annual Household
Income
Postsecondary
Enrollment
State Population

0
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(0.024,
0.04)

0.00

(3)
95%
(4)
95%
(5)
Private
Confidence
Public, 2Confidence
Public, 4Sector
Intervals
Year
Intervals
Year
Number of Colleges
1,597
774
515
Observations
25,552
12,384
8,240
R-squared
0.20
0.60
0.48
***Statistically Significant at 1% level **Statistically Significant at 5% level
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Monetary values in real 2017 dollars.

95%
Confidence
Intervals

Table 25. Average Price in Published Tuition and Fees at Private Institutions Before and After
the ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (High-Priced
$21,372.08
$25,207.62
$3,835.55
Institutions)
Treatment (Low$5,325.7
$6,817.7
$1,491.97
Priced Institutions)
Change in Mean
$-16,046.38
$-18,389.96
$-2,343.58
Published Tuition and
Fees
Table 26. Average Price in Published Tuition and Fees at Public, Two-Year Institutions Before
and After the ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (High-Priced
$5,676.1
$6,006.5
$330.34
Institutions)
Treatment (Low$2,618.3
$3,224.3
$606.03
Priced Institutions)
Change in Mean
$-3,057.85
$-2,782.16
$275.70
Published Tuition and
Fees
Effect of Large State Aid Programs on Education Tax Credit Distribution
Hypothesis 3: States with high levels of aid awarded to students (regardless if classified as need
or merit) receive fewer federal education tax credits.
Prior to analysis of the third hypothesis, similar steps were taken to ensure data met basic
assumptions of linear regression as in the prior analysis. These steps included accuracy of data
collection and entry, removal of missing values, and fit. Descriptive statistics ensured that all 50
states were represented throughout the 16 years of the analysis. Outliers were analyzed by
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Table 27. Average Price in Published Tuition and Fees at Public, Four-Year Institutions Before
and After the ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (High-Priced
$7,687.9
$9,106
$1,418.13
Institutions)
Treatment (Low$5,376.3
$7,260
$1,883.69
Priced Institutions)
Change in Mean
$-2,311.56
$-1,846
$465.56
Published Tuition and
Fees

standardizing scores — no score was below ± 3. The dependent variable, total education tax
credits, was normal; therefore, no transformations were necessary. Tables 15a and 15b detail the
descriptive statistics for the third hypothesis and the two models estimated. All monetary values
were adjusted to real 2017 dollars as done throughout each analysis.
Table 28. Descriptive Statistics Model 1: State Aid and Total Education Tax Credits (N = 34)
(Obs = 544)
Variable
Mean or %
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Total Education Tax Credits
Annual Median Household Income
Per State
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State
Population Per State
Percent of Private Institutions Per
State
Unemployment Rate Per State

$329,897.5
$60,441.38

456,783
8799.1

$10,214.5
$42,826

$2,898,065
$84,970

404,988
6,720,996
60.82%

515,708.9
7,953,731
13.53

27,872
500,017
20%

2,776,162
39,399,349
86.36%

5.8%

2.0

2.4%

12.2%

Region
New England
Middle Atlantic

14.7%
8.8%

East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

5.9%
14.7%
17.7%
5.9%
5.9%
14.7%
11.8%

(table cont’d)
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Variable
Treatment Group
High-Aid States (17)
Control Group
Low-Aid States (17)

Mean or %

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

272
(50%)
272
(50%)

533,907.2

$77,252.87

$2,898,065

75,673.8

$10,214.5

$401,787.9

Table 29. Descriptive Statistics Model 2: State Aid and Total Education Tax Credits (N = 34)
(Obs = 544)
Variable
Mean or %
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Total Education Tax Credits
Annual Median Household Income
Per State
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State
Population Per State
Percent of Private Institutions Per
State
Unemployment Rate Per State

$268,619.9
$61,024.59

339,047.4
8595.34

$10,214.5
$42,515

$2,119,323
$84,970

333,013.5
5,490,234
59.34%

333,985
5,583,428
13.1

27,872
500,017
20%

1,656,128
28,322,717
86.36%

5.7%

1.9

2.4%

13.3%

389,523

$42,416.31

$389,523

75,673.8

$10,214.5

$401,787.9

Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central

14.7%
8.8%
11.8%
17.7%
11.8%
2.9%
5.9%

Mountain
Pacific

17.7%
8.8%

Treatment Group
High-Aid States (17)
Control Group
Low-Aid States (17)

272
(50%)
272
(50%)

The parallel lines graph between the control and treatment groups (states providing lowaid versus states providing high-aid) in Figure 12 indicates the mean tax credits received per
group over time. For the first model, which includes those states offering broad-based aid like
the HOPE, Bright Futures, and TOPS scholarships, total education tax credits received by
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taxpayers throughout the years before the implementation of the AOTC remained relatively
stable and consistent for both high-aid and low-aid states. Low-aid states consistently received a
stable amount of tax credits per year, while high-aid states slowly but steadily received more tax
credits per year. However, after the AOTC implementation in 2009, both groups’ trends deviated
greatly. High-aid states show enormous growth in education tax credits while low-aid states
receive increasingly more tax credits but less in magnitude by comparison. Interestingly, it seems
that the take-up of tax credits falls between Tax Year 2012 and 2013 (CY 2013 and 2014) for
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both groups (yet more dramatically for the high-aid states) and then evens out henceforth.

2000

2010
year

2005
control

2015

2020

treatment

Figure 12. Parallel lines between state aid and total education tax credits (17 high aid states v. 17 low-aid
states including broad-based aid states).

Figure 13 shows the parallel lines of the second model, which analyzes total education
tax credits received by high- and low-aid states excluding the six largest, broad-based aid
programs. This exclusion is purposeful in order to remove any excess influence of these
abundant programs on the outcome. The figure shows stability and spikes consistent with Figure
12; however, the highest mean value drops from $1 million tax credits to $800,000 with the
exclusion of these broad-based state aid programs. It would seem that the six largest and most
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comprehensive state aid programs absorb about 25% of the total mean distribution of tax credits,
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contradicting the hypothesis connected with this analysis.
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Figure 13. Parallel lines between state aid and total education tax credits (17 high aid states v. 17 low aid
states without broad-based aid states).

Table 30 displays the results from the first and second models analyzing 34 states with
the highest and lowest aid awards and their respective total education tax credit amounts, with
robust standard errors in parentheses. This analysis identified whether total education tax credits
decreased in high-aid states as compared to low-aid states before and after the introduction of the
AOTC. To reiterate, the AOTC became a permanent fixture in the tax code in 2009, and it
provided more opportunities of eligibility and increased total awards. These enhanced criteria
presumably should cause a greater interaction between state aid amounts and tax credits because
of the exclusion of tax-free scholarships from tax credit eligibility. If a state has comprehensive
aid programs, then taxpayers receiving this aid should be ineligible from receiving education tax
credits — a mechanism the IRS deems duplicative and illegal.
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Model 1 analyzed the top 17 states dispensing aid (regardless of need or merit allocation)
and the lowest 17 states dispensing aid pre- and post-AOTC implementation, and the results
indicate that high-aid states actually received less education tax credits before the policy shock
but exorbitantly more after the policy shock than low-aid states. After the shock, the low-aid
states received 15.4% more tax credits whereas high-aid states received an increase of 501.2%!
These results show an appreciable baseline difference between the groups after the intervention
(AOTC), suggesting that the policy shock increased tax credits immensely to states with high-aid
programs. It is important to note the difference between the parallel lines graph’s mean
distribution and the difference-in-differences table means of each group. This difference is
caused by the adjusted coefficients after the control variables are included. These variables adjust
for state population, the percent of private institutions in a state, citizens enrolled in
postsecondary institutions, and other state-specific economic circumstances. Without the control
variables the impact of the shock is less dramatic. Low-aid states increase tax credits by 158.7%
and high-aid states increase by 153.9%. In the model without control variables, high-aid states
still received the most education tax credits; however, low-aid states increased at a much higher
rate after the AOTC implementation. These contradictory results can be explained by the lack of
control of population size, students enrolled in postsecondary education, and the amount of
expensive (private) schools within a state.
The results for Model 2 with the exclusion of the six states that have broad-based and
comprehensive aid programs indicate similar results to Model 1 before and after the policy
shock. However, the amplitude of the DD estimator is lower, but not by much. This is indicative
of the lack of influence from these large programs, but their absence does not switch the outcome
effect. After the shock, the low-aid states received 18.8% more tax credits whereas high-aid

105

states received an increase of 515.5%. In the model without control variables, high-aid states still
received the most education tax credits; however, low-aid states increased at a much higher rate
after the AOTC implementation. Low-aid states increase tax credits by 158.7% and high-aid
states increase by 159.3%. The difference in the difference in difference estimators between the
two models is only $17,378.4. This indicates that the overall removal of states with large aid
programs did hardly anything to the model and thus strengthens the outcome that high aid states
receive more education tax credits.
As for the control variables in Model 1, unemployment, annual household income, state
population, and regional differences are significant. For every percent increase in the
unemployment rate, states increase education tax credits by $21,014.9. For every dollar increase
in annual household income within a state, the amount of education tax credits increases by
$2.09. Additionally, for every additional person in a state, the amount of education tax credits
dispensed within a state increases by $0.05. Postsecondary enrollment and percent of private
institutions within a state were included as control variables; however, their overall impact was
negligible and insignificant.
In Model 2, the statistically significant control variables include annual household
income, unemployment rate, postsecondary enrollment, percent of private institutions, and
regional differences. For every dollar increase in annual household income within a state, the
amount of education tax credits increases by $2.12. Consequentially, for every percent increase
in the unemployment rate, states increase education tax credits by $11,006. Every additional
student increases tax credits by $0.47. However, for states with higher percentages of private
institutions, the amount of education tax credits decreases by $710. This last finding is curious as
intuition would state that the more expensive aggregate tuition and fees in a state are, the more
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education tax credits would be received. However, this does not seem to be the case. Looking at
the other statistically significant control variables, it seems that there may be an interaction
between private institutions and income. States with more private institutions may have higher
income levels that fall outside the eligibility level of education tax credits.
Regions seem to effect differential tax credit amounts in both models. In Model 1, Middle
Atlantic States, West North Central states, and Pacific states all remain statistically significant
and different from the baseline value of New England states. New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania have an average value of total credits that are $123,931 more than Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, controlling for other
control variables in the model. Most of the New England states are very low in the ranking of
state aid while the Middle Atlantic States rank quite high. Therefore, this increase from the
baseline value is credible. West North Central States (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota) have an average value of total credits that are
$47,129 more than the New England States. Ironically, the Pacific states (Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington) have an average value of total credits that are $73,718 lower
than the New England States. California consistently ranks high among state aid programs;
however, the other states within the Pacific region also rank relatively low in state aid.
In Model 2, only the Middle Atlantic States and East North Central States remain
statistically significant. New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania have an average value of total
credits that are $140,184 more than Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Vermont, controlling for other covariates in the model. Additionally, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin (East North Central States) have an average value of total credits
that are $64,605 more than the New England States. The Pacific States are not statistically
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significant in the model with large broad-based aid programs excluded; however, the results
suggest that with the removal of California, the tax credit amount becomes more similar to the
New England States. Reviewing the non-significant results of the South Atlantic States
(Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia) in both models suggests that large aid programs do increase education tax credit
amounts as their removal — going from Model 1 to Model 2 — decreases the coefficients closer
to the baseline level.
It is interesting to note that the R2 values for these two models in this analysis are much
larger than in the previous models — indicating that these two models fit the data exceedingly
well. The higher R2 may be caused by the different unit of analysis (state) in this particular
analysis, which has less uncontrolled differences than the institutions between states.
Tables 17 and 18 detail the DD results. The Difference-in-Differences Tables display the
coefficients for the pre- and post-time periods for both the control and treatment groups along
with their differences in each segment. The last row in the first column indicates the differences
in the high- and low-aid states before 2009, and the last row in the second column indicates the
differences in the high- and low-aid states after 2009. The last row in the last column indicates
the difference of the differences for both time and group, thus presenting an estimate of the
overall impact of the intervention.
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Table 30. State Aid Effect on Total Education Tax Credits
Dependent Variable: Total Education Tax Credits

High-Aid States
After Intervention

(1)
Inclusion of
Broad-Based
Aid States
$446,789.4***
(70,485.01)

Low-Aid States
After Intervention
Differential Effect (DD
estimator)
Control Variables
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Unemployment Rate
Annual Household Income
Postsecondary Enrollment

State Population
% of Private Institutions

(303,386.6,
590,192.2)

(2)
Exclusion of
Broad-Based
Aid States
$361,330.2***
(52,451.6)

$49,583.71***
(12,507.69)

(24,136.63,
75,030.8)

$48,560.13***
(10,962.7)

(27,073.7,
70,046.6)

397,205.7***
(73,380.48)

(247,912,
546,499.4)

312,770.1***
(53,931.8)

(207,065.6,
418,474.5)

Base (0)
123,931.9**
(45928)
61,759.01
(46,157)
47,129.3**
(23,069.7)
56,236.7
(38,653.3)
3,959.3
(36,653.7)
27,765.9
(50,488.7)
-2,268.9
(23,302.2)
-73,718**
(35,036.6)

-(30490.7, 217,373)

Base (0)
140,184***
(35,358.7)
64,604.9**
(17,462.7)
14,743.9
(16,797.6)
5,558.9
(12,735.8)
12,267.5
(19,869.2)
34,154.2
(27,920.9)
-18,721.8
(18,805.8)
-30,353.2
(15,169.9)

-(68,246.3,
212,121.8)
(29,076.8,
100,133)
(-19,431.01,
48,918.8)
(-20,352.2,
31,469.9)
(-28,159.7,
52,691.7)
(-22,651.3,
90,959.8)
(-56,982.5,
19,538.9)
(-61,216.7, 510.2)

21,014.9**
(6398.96)
2.09**
(0.96)
0.37
(0.13)

(7,996.2, 34,033.8)

11,006.4**
(3,256.4)
2.1**
(0.86)
0.47**
(0.19)

(4381.3, 17,631.5)

0.046***
(0.01)
-573.02
(560.53)

(0.03, 0.07)

0.02
(0.01)
-710.02**
(336.7)

(-0.001, 0.04)

95% Confidence
Intervals

(-32,148.1,
155,666.1)
(193.5, 94,0645)
(-22,404.1,
134,877.5)
(-70,613.2,
78,531.9)
(-74,954.2,
130,486)
(-49,677.6,
45,139.8)
(-145,000.5,
-2,435.6)

(0.141, 4.05)
(-0.23, 0.3)

(-1713.4, 567.39)

(table cont’d)
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95% Confidence
Intervals
(258,526.9,
464,133.5)

(0.37, 3.9)
(0.08, 0.9)

(-1394.95, -25.09)

(1)
Inclusion of
Broad-Based
Aid States

95% Confidence
Intervals

(2)
Exclusion of
Broad-Based
Aid States

95% Confidence
Intervals

Number of States
34
34
Observations
544
544
R-squared
0.90
0.92
***Statistically Significant at 1% level. **Statistically Significant at 5% level.
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Monetary values in real 2017 dollars. State tax credits in
000s.

Table 31. Model 1: Total Education Tax Credits per State Before and After the ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (Low-Aid
$322,465.8
$372,049.5
$49,583.71
States)
Treatment (High-Aid
$89,142.65
$535,932.1
$446,789.4
States)
Change in Mean
$-233,323.15
$16,388.26
$330,148.5
Total Education Tax
Credits
Note. State tax credits in 000s.

Table 32. Model 2: Total Education Tax Credits per State Before and After the ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (Low-Aid
$261,851.5
$310,411.6
$48,560.13
States)
Treatment (High-Aid
$70,443.21
$431,773.4
$361,330.2
States)
Change in Mean
$-191,408.3
$12,136.18
$312,770.1
Total Education Tax
Credits
Note. State tax credits in 000s.

The analysis for Models 1 and 2 above were based on the most recent year analysis of
high-aid status. Therefore, the seventeen states in the high aid group and the seventeen states in
the low aid group were selected for analysis based on a single time point. This was done based
on a cursory review of the amount of aid for each state over the last sixteen years. To validate my
findings based on the selection of the 17 states with high-aid, I also ran an analysis on the full
group of states throughout the sixteen years to ensure I selected the correct high and low aid
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states for the prior analyses. States that issued more than $195 million were classified as high-aid
states and states that offered lower than this amount were classified as low-aid states.
Table 33. Descriptive Statistics for Full Validation Model: State Aid and Total Education Tax
Credits (N = 50) (Obs = 800)
Variable
Mean or %
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Total Education Tax Credits
Annual Median Household Income Per
State
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State
Population Per State
Percent of Private Institutions Per State
Unemployment Rate Per State

$297,216.8
$59,319.42

396,149.4
9,263.4

$10,214.5
$34,916

$2,898,065
$84,970

372,717.5
6,131,117
59.39%
5.9%

437,582.5
6,780,541
13.4
2.0

27,872
500,017
20%
2.4%

2,776,162
39,399,349
86.36%
14.4%

225
(28%)

544,873

$195,457,153

$2,207,229,000

575
(72%)

163,385.1

$0

$194,800,160

Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central

12%
6%
10%
14%
16%
8%

West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

8%
16%
10%

Treatment Group
High-Aid States
Control Group
Low-Aid States
Note. State tax credits in 000s.

The parallel lines graph in Figure 14 is relatively similar than the prior models. However,
running the analysis with the full amount of states over the years increases the total amount of
tax credits overall for both high and low aid states. High-aid states, when adjusted for control
variables, actually received less tax credits than low-aid states before the AOTC implementation;
however, after the policy shock, high-aid states received appreciably more tax credits than lowaid states. Low-aid states, after the policy shock, received 47% more education tax credits (more
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Figure 14. Parallel lines between state aid and total education tax credits (full model).

Table 34. State Aid Effect on Total Education Tax Credits (Full Model)
Dependent Variable: Total Education Tax Credits

High-Aid States
After Intervention

Low-Aid States
After Intervention

Differential Effect (DD
estimator)
Control Variables
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic

Full Model

95% Confidence
Intervals

Full Model
Exclusion of
Broad-Based
Aid States

95% Confidence
Intervals

508,371.7***
(76,467.9)

(354,703.6,
662,039.8)

441,863.9***
(66,371)

(308,013.9,
575,713.8)

116,865.8***
(16,061.7)

(84,588.5,
149,143.1)

110,090.7***
(15,998)

(77,827.6,
142,353.7)

391,505.9***
(80,593.6)

(229,547,
553,464.9)

331,773.2***
(69,109.3)

(192,401,
471,145.5)

Base (0)
127,647.5**
(40,516.3)
57,423.6
(31,880)
1103.5
(15,329.3)
17,167.5
(24,811.7)

-(46,227,
209,068.1)
(-6,641.7,
121,488.9)
(-29,701.8,
31,908.8)
(-32,693.5,
67,028.5)

Base (0)
149,225.1***
(41,004.6)
81,159.2*
(30,200.5)
-6,656.6
(13,293.6)
-12,986.9
(22,182)

-(66,531.4,
231,198.8)
(20,253.9,
142,064.4)
(-33,465.7,
20,152.6)
(-57,721.2,
31,747.6)

(table cont’d)
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East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Unemployment Rate
Annual Household
Income
Postsecondary
Enrollment
State Population
% of Private Institutions

Full Model

95%
Confidence
Intervals

Full Model
Exclusion of
Broad-Based
Aid States

-52,438.8
(32,915.6)
-56,415.7
(32,071.7)
-22,369.5
(14,782.6)
-69,223.5**
(27,935)

(-118,585.1,
13,707.5)
(-120,866.5,
8,034.8)
(-52,076.2,
7,337.2)
(-125,361, 13,085.9)

-12,922.5
(29,154.2)
-14,274.9
(27,008.7)
-18,485.7
(13,696.1)
-28,709.3
(15,583.8)

(-71,717.5,
45,872.5)
(-68,743.2,
40,193.4)
(-46,106.5, 9,135.1)

3,385.8
(3,438.3)
0.05
(0.99)
-0.05
(0.13)

(-3,523.7,
10,295.2)
(-1.9, 2.03)

-405.2
(2674.4)
0.8
(0.83)
0.36**
(0.12)

(-5,798.7, 4,988.2)

0.054***
(0.01)
48.6
(425.9)

(0.04, 0.07)

0.03**
(0.01)
-76.5
(319.7)

(0.01, 0.04)

(-0.31, 0.2)

(-807.2, 904.5)

Number of States
Observations

50
800

44
704

R-squared

0.87

0.88

95% Confidence
Intervals

(-60,137.1, 2,718.5)

(-0.9, 2.5)
(0.11, 0.6)

(-721.1, 568.2)

***Statistically Significant at 1% level. **Statistically Significant at 5% level. *Statistically Significant
at 10% level. Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Monetary values in real 2017 dollars. State
tax credits in 000s.

than double the Model 1 results in the partial estimation). High-aid states, after the policy shock,
received 1,067% more education tax credits (more than double the Model 1 results in the partial
estimation). The exclusion of the states with broad-based aid programs also behaved similarly to
Model 2 in the partial estimation where the DD estimator was moderately lower than Model 1.
However, low-aid states actually saw an increase in tax credits by 57%, while high-aid states saw
less of an increase than Model 2 in the partial estimation, of only 875%. This suggests that the
inclusion of states with comprehensive aid programs actually does increase the amount of overall
tax credits in aggregate. The first and second model of the partial estimation show part of the
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picture of state aid program effects on tax credit receipts since this modeling was based on a
single-year’s selection of units. The full validation model shows the entire picture of state aid
program effects on tax credit receipts. It therefore shows the more precise magnitude of the
inclusion of all states with high-aid programs over the 16 years studied.
The impact of the control variables are slightly different as well. In the full model, only
regional differences and state population are statistically significant. For every additional person
in a state, the amount of education tax credits dispensed increases by $0.05. Furthermore, the
Middle Atlantic States (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) have an average value of total
credits that are $127,647.5 more than the New England States. In the Full Model with the
exclusion of states with broad-based aid programs, regional difference, postsecondary
enrollments, and state population are statistically significant. For every student enrolled in this
model, education tax credits increase by $0.36, and for every additional person in the state, tax
credits increase by $0.03. Middle Atlantic States also have an average value of total credits that
are $149,225 more than the New England States, and the East North Central States (excluding
Indiana) have an average value of total credits that are $81,159.2 more than the New England
States. In the full model, the regional effects on the Pacific States are no longer significant as are
the effects of the unemployment rate and the percent of private institutions in the area —
noticeable in Models 1 and 2.
However, comparing the full model with the condensed version, the results indicate
similar findings — that states with large aid programs actually receive more education tax credits
than their low-aid counterparts. The DD estimator is slightly lower in the full model as compared
to Model 1 by 5,695.8; however, the DD estimator is slightly higher in the full model excluding
comprehensive aid programs than in Model 2 by 19,003.1. These changes are caused by the
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magnitude from increased control of the data. Overall, these models show that the exclusion of
the six states with broad-based aid programs actually causes a decrease in tax credit allotment
and further supports the idea that high aid states receive more tax credits than low aid states.
Table 35. Full Validation Model: Total Education Tax Credits per State Before and After the
ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (Low-Aid
$245,368.2
$362,234
$116,865.8
States)
Treatment (High-Aid
$-47,616.5**
$460,755.2
$508,371.7
States)
Change in Mean
$-292,984.7
$98,521.2
$391,505.9
Total Education Tax
Credits
**Statistically Significant at 5% level.
Note. State tax credits in 000s.

Table 36. Full Validation Model Excluding Broad-Based Aid States: Total Education Tax
Credits per State Before and After the ARRA of 2009
Variable
Pre
Post
Difference
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Control (Low-Aid
$192,296.5
$302,387.1
$110,090.7
States)
Treatment (High-Aid
$-50,481.8**
$391,382.1
$441,863.9
States)
Change in Mean
$-242,778.2
$88,995
$331,773.2
Total Education Tax
Credits
**Statistically Significant at 5% level.
Note. State tax credits in 000s.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
Summary of Study
Education tax credits are a major federal expense, provided to taxpayers who enroll, or
have dependents enroll, in an eligible postsecondary institution. There are currently thirteen
education tax incentives available to various income levels via the Tax Code. While the tuition
and fee deduction (one of the thirteen tax incentive programs) was suspended for Tax Years
2018 and 2019, total foregone revenue for education tax expenditures decreased slightly from
$30.8 billion to $27.4 billion for Fiscal Year 2019 (JCT, 2019). Of this gargantuan sum,
education tax credits make up the bulk — around $18-19 billion annually. However, empirical
research indicates that this federal expense is not effective when it comes to promoting college
enrollment nationwide (Bulman & Hoxby, 2015; Long, 2004; LaLumia, 2012; Turner, 2011).
Furthermore, the IRS stipulates that a taxpayer, who receives a tax-free scholarship or
grant (federal or state), must subtract the amount used for qualified education expenses such as
tuition and required fees before determining the tax credit amount (IRS, 2020). Long (2004)
analyzed the effects of state appropriations on institutions in high- and low-tuition states after the
implementation of the Tax Relief Act of 1997. She found that low-tuition states generally saw a
decrease in state appropriations after the policy shock for two-year institutions. Although her
results indicated that there may be some decreases in state appropriations for both two-year and
four-year institutions with many tax credit-eligible students, these results were not statistically
significant. This analysis is similar in nature but asked a different question altogether — do states
with high-aid programs receive less education tax credits due to the interaction between tax
credit eligibility and tax-free scholarships? This question was based on intuitive reasoning using
Long’s (2004) results and deductive reasoning based on the tax credit interaction stated in policy.
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It is important to secure an answer to this question as many states spend upward from
$300 million to $2 billion a year on state aid programs for higher education (NASSGAP, 2020).
This amount of spending is a testament to certain states’ commitments to higher education;
however, no one has determined so far if federal education tax credits flow more towards low-aid
states because of the disconnect between federal and state policy. For instance, since California
spends approximately $2 billion annually on state aid programs, there is deductive evidence to
suggest that the state may be spending a large sum of money on taxpayers who would receive
some recompense from the federal government for the same action, for enrolling in college. If
the amount of state aid lowered to interact effectively with federal policy, the state could save
millions on other budgetary objectives, without detrimental costs to higher education. There
would essentially be a supplanting of payments — from state to federal — for certain costs of
higher education.
This study also incorporated key questions answered by Long (2004) concerning
institutional responses to education tax credits, more so to update and validate her results. With
data available 17 years after her analysis, it was time for a validation study. The implications of
state and institutional responses to education tax credits are necessary to identify in an era where
states continually fund higher education at historic lows, the net cost of attendance at
postsecondary institutions increase at a rate higher than the rate of inflation, and the wealth gap
between the nation’s richest and poorest populations has more than doubled since 1989 (Pew,
2020). Therefore, the following discussion details the results of this study, how these results fit
with the study’s theoretical framework, how they fit with the hypothesis and research questions
of the analysis, and how they may lead to a better understanding of federal-state partnerships.
Additionally, I will outline the limitations of this study, recommendations for federal and state
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policy for higher education, and possible further research on this overlooked yet costly policy
mechanism.
Relevant Theories, Hypotheses, and Results
The three social economic theories mentioned in Chapter 2 are the backdrop for which
education tax credits originated. These theories are rational choice, market failure via
externalities, and human capital. Without the need for more credentials and skills due to a
complex and technological world, the idea behind funding taxpayers to afford such training and
education would be unnecessary. Furthermore, subsidies for education are entirely necessary
because they remedy the imbalance between the social marginal benefit and social marginal
costs of the supply and demand curve, which leads to the under-valuing of education. This
undervaluing of a service that benefits all of society, not just the consumers of the service, thus
creates market failure. Together with the rational choice of consumers to pay for or alleviate the
payment of education, education tax credits have an entirely rational origination story. Through
the use of a relatively easy mechanism to dispense funding to subsidize skills needed for the
knowledge-based economy, skills necessary to benefit society as a whole, any rational actor
should choose to enroll in postsecondary education.
However, this is not the case. Research has shown that enrollments in postsecondary
education have not increased due to the influence of education tax credits (Bulman & Hoxby,
2015; Long, 2004; LaLumia, 2012). Coincidentally, institutions and states may act incongruent
to the intentions of education tax credits, which are to lessen the costs of postsecondary
attendance. The two other theories proposed in Chapter 2 relating to state budgeting, flypaper
effects and cooperative federalism, are influential in forming the hypotheses used in this study.
First, if institutions and states increase costs or decrease funding to capture federal dollars in
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order to get out of state commitments to education, this analysis may provide proof that budget
supplanting is a real and menacing concept. However, if states actually increase funding to
higher education when provided intergovernmental fund transfers, then the presence of the
flypaper effect may be observed. Furthermore, if states proceed to alter current aid program
allotments to capture federal dollars via tax credits, then the need for a coordinated, federal-state
partnership may be warranted to prevent state budget levels from falling off to capture an
alternative revenue stream.
The results of Research Question 1 indicate that states do vary considerably in the
amount of education tax credits dispersed even when isolating state population and other statecentric economic variables. For example, Louisiana and Alabama have similar sized populations,
yet Alabama receives 10-15% more total tax credits and, per capita, receives $25 more on
average. More pronounced, Wyoming and Vermont have similar populations, yet Vermont
receives $10,483 more total education tax credits and $252 more per capita.
In addition, the results indicate that upper-income populations have increased usage of
this tax program more frequently than their middle- and lower-income counterparts since tax
credit origination. Nationally, upper-income ($100,000 and above) populations increased receipts
of education tax credits more than a thousand fold from TY 1998 to TY 2017 — specifically by
111,589%. Middle-income populations in the U.S. increased receipts twofold, or 108%, and
lower-income populations increased receipts threefold, or 220%. It is notable that the total
education tax credit amount nationally, regardless of income, only increased a little more than
twofold, or 241% since TY 1998. Since the eligibility of higher-incomes in 2009 with the
implementation of the AOTC, upper-income populations have remained at the same level,
absorbing about 22% of the total education tax credit amount nationally. Lower-income
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populations continuously receive around 48% of the total tax credit amount, while middleincome populations hold out at 30%. This has changed dramatically since TY 1998 when
eligibility rules were different, and the objective of the tax credit was to alleviate the costs of
education for middle-income populations. Middle and lower-income populations at that time
received a 50%/50% allotment. Now, the favored beneficiaries of education tax credits seem to
be lower- and upper-income populations.
What about tax liability? Who benefits the most from tax liability coverage via tax
credits? Lower-income populations benefit the most from reducing total tax liability (or money
owed to the government) since the establishment of the AOTC. Since the AOTC expanded
eligibility, upper-income populations have increased usage of tax credits lowering their total tax
liability by 1.16%, a little less than the middle-income population nationally, 2.33%. In this
aspect, education tax credits do seem to progressively impact lower-income populations more so
than the other populations, serving an objective deigned by the originators of the AOTC — to
enhance access to postsecondary education for lower-income households. These two aspects
show the positive and negative sides of aid dispensed through the tax code — much reaches the
populations in need, but the higher incomes capture billions in federal dollars — approximately
$4 billion annually.
Viewing these results through the market failure lens, the federal government should
subsidize higher education for its positive externalities; however, subsidization should also be
fiscally responsible. If research and evidence point to windfall payments to upper-income
populations who would enroll regardless of the tax credit as well as evidence that tax credits do
not increase college enrollment, then remediation is highly necessary to prevent wasteful
spending.
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The results of Research Question 2 related to how institutions from all sectors responded
to the introduction of the American Opportunity Tax Credit in 2009. State appropriations
decreased after the introduction of the tax credits for two-year, low-price (less than $4,000 net
tuition and fees) institutions yet increased for two-year high-priced institutions. Furthermore,
higher-priced (greater than $4,000 net tuition and fees), four-year institutions actually received
less in state appropriations than lower-priced, four-year institutions. Essentially, these results
suggest that states modified appropriations to institutions (both two-year and four-year) where
tuition was lowest enough to warrant full tax credit reimbursement; thus, suggesting that states
did indeed try to supplant their budgets with federal dollars via education tax credits. These
results are similar to Long’s (2004) where public, two-year institutions charging less than $1,000
“experienced a 57 percent reduction in state appropriations per student relative to colleges that
cost more than $2,000” (p. 41). Readjusting for current dollars and for increased criteria from the
AOTC, my results indicate that low-priced, two-year schools received 3.9% less state
appropriations than before the policy change and low-priced, four-year schools received 9.3%
less. High-priced, four-year institutions also received much less state appropriations, 16.8% less;
however, high-priced, two-year institutions actually received an increase in state appropriations,
11.7% more.
Although the reduction in high-priced, four-year institutions may show an underlying
trend in reorganizing funds in a more fiscally responsible manner; there is evidence in this
analysis that states did not maintain state funding to schools in most need of funding in the face
of education tax credit implementation. Therefore, the flypaper effect does not seem to be a
plausible theory in this aspect. Education tax credits did not stimulate maintenance or growth in
state appropriations to higher education, except for high-priced, two-year public institutions.
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Institutional response is more pronounced than the state response to education tax credits.
Both high- and low-price private institutions increased tuition and fees by 18% and 28% after the
policy shock, respectively. Similarly, both two-year and four-year, public institutions - regardless
of low or high price - increased tuition and fees after the policy shock. Low-price, two-year
institutions increased tuition by 23%, whereas high-price counterparts increased tuition by only
5.8%. Low-price, four-year institutions increased tuition by 35%, whereas high-price
counterparts increased tuition by 18.4%. These increases in tuition and fees after the introduction
of the tax credits especially at the most tax credit-eligible institutions suggest that institutions
practiced the same supplanting as states since state appropriations became less of a source of
revenue for institutional budgets. Low-priced institutions may have hoped that the increase in
tuition and fees would enable enrollees to receive the maximum tax credit with an increase in
tuition and fees, thus increasing institutional funding yet dampening the full extent of the cost
increase to taxpayers.
The results of Research Question 3 related to how states responded to the introduction of
the AOTC in 2009. After the policy shock, high-aid states - ranked as the top 17 states regardless
of merit- or need-based criteria - received more education tax credits than low-aid states;
although before the policy shock, low-aid states (adjusting for control variables) received more
tax credits on average than high-aid states. After the introduction of the AOTC and controlling
for state population and other economic variables, high-aid states increased tax credit receipts
dramatically, by 501.2% as opposed to low-aid states, by 15.4%. Removing the states that have
very large and comprehensive state aid programs like TOPS, HOPE, 21st Century Scholars, etc.,
the results indicated the same pronounced increase for high-aid states. However, the difference
between the models before and after the increase in education tax credits indicates that these
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broad-based programs may have been the cause of a slight decrease in receipts. The second
model without the broad-based programs saw an increase of 515.5% in education tax credits
after the AOTC introduction. This is a 14.3% difference than in the first model; therefore, there
may have been some interactive effect concerning large, comprehensive state programs after all.
The full validation model, however, confirms that the exclusion of states with comprehensive aid
programs actually does decrease the overall amount of tax credits received, providing proof that
the issuance of high amounts of aid within a state does not preclude the state from receiving
education tax credits. Overall, the main results indicate that states with high-aid programs do in
fact receive the most education tax credits as opposed to states who offer the lowest amount of
aid to taxpayers.
Outcome Effects and Federal-State Partnerships
Although the results of this analysis are different from what was to be expected, they do shed
light on the possibilities for remediation and change. High-aid states are generally not losing out on
federal dollars via education tax credits, but the results for Research Question 1 indicate that many of
the funds dispersed go to incomes that are not in need of such credits and would enroll in college
regardless — a $4 billion windfall. Furthermore, upon reviewing the population change and
postsecondary enrollment changes of the states with the largest amount of state aid over time, it was
interesting to see that although populations in each state are increasing, not all states are seeing
postsecondary enrollment increases of the same magnitude. In many states, postsecondary enrollment
is actually decreasing even when the state population is increasing. In Indiana, Tennessee, Louisiana,
Florida, and Georgia (states with comprehensive aid programs), populations are increasing, but
college-going behavior is decreasing. Although this study does not go into the effects of decreased
college-going behavior, the ramifications of decreased enrollments in the face of increased education
tax credit spending linger. If enrollments are dwindling in the states that are receiving the most
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education tax credits, are education tax credits really promoting college-going behavior? Are
education tax credits, thus, not being used for the action that it was created for? Ironically, in many
low-aid states, postsecondary enrollments are increasing yet education tax credits remain relatively
flat.
Perhaps a form of matching should be established between the states and the federal
government to utilize the best course of action for fiscal efficiency. Matching programs “match”
states dollars with federal dollars to encourage a particular state action deemed necessary or
appropriate by the federal government — an action that would benefit society as a whole. Matching,
block grant, incentive, and leveling programs are all mechanism of federal-state partnerships that are
the basis of cooperative federalism (Doyle & Pingel, 2016). The median value of education tax
credits per state is approximately $243 million. If the upper-income portion of education tax credits
were removed and dispersed to states to maintain their level of funding, each state would only
receive approximately $80 million — not enough to provide an equivalent 1:1 match. However, if the
federal government used the tax credit program as an incentive program as a whole on the basis that
states had to maintain or increase aid to postsecondary education, an equal distribution of the current
$18 billion spent on education tax credits annually could be dispersed in $360 million portions. This
would be a relative 1:1 match. Of course, every state would receive more or less than the median
value and would correspond with the equivalent amount in federal dollars. Another key aspect to this
supposed incentive/matching program would be the direct transfer of federal funds to states or
institutions. If the federal-state partnership began as an incentive program, letting states choose to
join in return for the federal dollars of education tax credits, it would be hard for a state to defer on
such an opportunity. If a state chose not to participate, it would lose out on education tax credit
dollars - once felt indirectly in the states’ budgets - as taxpayers spend tax credit refundable dollars,
or they use extra personal funds felt from a decrease in federal taxes owed within the state’s
economy.
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A somewhat similar recommendation has already been made by the Bipartisan Policy
Center’s (BPC) Taskforce on Higher Education Financing and Student Outcomes. The Taskforce
formalized several recommendations to help form “a blueprint for a comprehensive and bipartisan
HEA reauthorization” (Hoagland, Akabas, Megan, Bitar, Carmody, Middleton & Aborn, 2020, p.
10). One of these recommendations is to eliminate the AOTC, the LLTC, and the student loan
interest deduction entirely to then fund a federal-state partnership. This partnership would entail a
state-optional 1:4 matching program (one state dollar equates to four federal dollars), totaling $5
billion annually. For a state to receive these funds, the recommendations suggest states would have to
“increase total higher education spending relative to a three-year rolling average of previous
investment levels” and any additional dollar above this three-year average would be entitled to a $4
federal match (Hoagland et al., 2020, p. 63). Furthermore, states would be restricted on how they
increase aid dollars, specifically additional aid should fall under need-based aid or increasing access
to low- and middle-income populations.
The BPC recommendation formulates its federal-state partnership funding model based on
the total annual expenditures of not just the AOTC and the LLTC but also the expenditures of the
student loan interest deduction, which altogether total $200 billion over the next ten years.
Eliminating these programs over the next ten years would presumably provide the funding needed to
establish the matching program. The CBO projects the revenue saved per year to be around $20
billion dollars annually. Although the BPC recommendations only allocate $5 billion annually for the
match program to help maintain or grow state expenditures on higher education, the rest of the
revenue savings would go to increasing the purchasing power of the Pell Grant — increasing funding
by $9 billion per year (Hoagland et al., 2020).
Taking the two suggestions into consideration — 1) a completely state-optional, conditional
grants-in-aid program that basically unlocks currently provided education tax credit dollars (which
directly flow to states or institutions) if states agree to maintain and grow their higher education
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budgets, an $18 billion annual incentive program, or 2) a federal matching program that provides $5
billion to maintain and grow state higher education budgets while increasing Pell Grant expenditures
by $9 billion — provides two examples of specific possibilities. The first suggestion gives more
power to the states, providing federal dollars that could be spent in any manner to increase access and
affordability. Of course, as the BPC recommendations similarly state, these dollars would have to be
spent on low- to middle-income populations to prevent windfall payments to higher income levels
that are fiscally irresponsible. The BPC suggestion gives much power to the states, but also increases
the funding for a federal grant program that is nationally used.
Comparing the two suggestions is much like comparing apples to apples and oranges to
oranges, but I think the real differences would come about in identifying which suggestion offers the
most benefits to states. The BPC recommendation offers a proposed allocation formula that takes into
account a state’s public institution’s affordability, the state’s tax effort, which measures how much a
state actually spends on higher education based on its total tax base, the number of degrees earned at
public institutions within a state, and a weight for the state’s wealth and for its population size
(Hoagland et al., 2020). Nationally, states would vary widely on the amount of the matched dollars
they would receive based on this allocation formula just as they would be based on the total tax
credits dispensed annually. It would take some projections and comparisons of such projections to
see which program is the most ideal. Ultimately, if the first suggestion does not come with specific
verbiage on what states can and can’t do with the fund transfer, the partnership would fail. States
would then fall prey to the lures of budget supplanting. However, a key similarity exists between
these two suggestions — the removal of direct vouchers to individuals and a reversal back to
subsidizing higher education via funding directly to states and institutions. Not only do tax credits
and other voucher-like programs promote the funding of private institutions, who are not held to the
same legal and accountability measures as public institutions, they also do nothing to keep the rising
costs of higher education down. Vouchers essentially kill any public good service by providing
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individuals with options to afford (or think they can afford) going to more extravagant and
overpriced institutions, thus creating an arms race in tuition and fees for public institutions to attract
the students who help keep the lights on.

Recommendations for Federal and State Policy
If the federal government does not incorporate the suggestions from the BPC or utilize
some form of my own recommendation above, it should at least adhere to the following
recommendations to make tax credit programs more efficient and equitable.
Timing. The timing of tax credit awards comes long after college costs are collected, which deter
liquidity-constrained individuals from enrolling in the first place, up to 15 months later
(Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). According to the 2008 campaign booklet Blueprint for
Change: Obama and Biden’s Plan for America, presidential and vice-presidential-hopefuls,
Barack Obama and Joe Biden, detailed how the American Opportunity Tax Credit could be
available at the time of enrollment “by using prior year’s tax data to deliver the credit at the time
that tuition is due” (Obama & Biden, 2008, p. 5). This is a viable method of delivery that may
incentivize college-going behavior.
Income Caps. Higher income eligibility for current tax savings could be removed from
thresholds while maintaining the tax refund component to taxpayers with low to zero tax
liability. Savings could be pronounced if income capped out at $67,000 for single filers and
$134,000 for married filers similar to the LLTC (indexed for inflation). Further, if the income
cap stood at $100,000 for married filers, the savings could total approximately $4 billion
annually.
Remove Interaction Between Pell Grant and Education Tax Credits and Combine with Pell
Grant Aid. According to the IRS instructions for tax benefits for education, Publication 970, a
taxpayer, who receives a tax-free scholarship or grant (federal or state) must subtract the amount
127

used for qualified education expenses such as tuition and required fees before determining the
tax credit amount (IRS, 2020). Removing this interaction would increase the purchasing power
of the Pell Grant in combination with tax credit aid. This maximum tax credit ($2,500) could
increase purchasing power for the lowest incomes from 29% at public, four-year schools to 40%.
Simplification. Tax provisions should be as simple as possible for the average taxpayer, who may
or may not be able to afford professional tax preparation. Simplicity offers taxpayers less
chances of inputting false or incorrect information, which leads to greater auditing costs for the
IRS. Simplification of the tax code also leads to more taxpayers claiming a tax provision that
could be beneficial to themselves and thus towards greater national economic prosperity.
Duplicative tax provisions also prevent taxpayers from claiming the most tax savings. Choosing
between the AOTC, the LLTC, the above-the-line tuition and fee deduction, or any of the various
education tax incentives is based on several complex factors including, but not limited to,
qualified expenses, time spent in college, and full- or part-time status.
Limitations
Several limitations are prevalent throughout this analysis, and a few limitations presented
themselves during or after the analysis. It is important to note that this analysis is not a true,
random experiment; although, it is as close to a random experiment as a counterfactual
comparison can get in the social sciences. Causality is estimated in the difference-in-differences
strategy by identifying parallel trends before and after a series of time between a sufficiently
chosen treatment and control group. This parallel trend and the use of a control and treatment
group adjust for confounding or omitted variable bias. However, in the social sciences, there is
always the possibility that some other unmentioned variable influences the outcome. Complete
causality thus cannot be construed here.
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Validation studies help strengthen causality. Models 1 and 2 of the third research
question are somewhat validated by the inclusion of a full model to check that coefficients are
similar. Further validation studies that incorporate different estimation strategies could help
strengthen causality such as the use of an analysis using regression discontinuity or comparative
interrupted time series. If coefficients are similar in both strategies, then the outcome of the
analyses can be suggested as causal. Validated studies lead to more reliable results, which can
then be generalized to a broader population (Somers et al., 2013).
After running the analyses on all the research questions in this analysis, a possible
omitted variable came to mind. Since the data spans from TY 2001 to TY 2016, the Great
Recession of 2008 may have played an impact on the outcomes. Therefore, in a future analysis, a
dummy variable will be created to show which years in the analysis were before and after the
recession. The recession plays a major role for state appropriations, state grant aid,
unemployment, postsecondary enrollment, published tuition and fees, and other variables
included in this analysis. Coefficients may be skewed due to the omission of this control
variable.
Upon reading the recent BPC recommendations, the allocation formula mentioned
controls for state wealth by using state gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Hoagland et al.,
2020). This may be a better measure than median annual household income to measure a state’s
prosperity level. At least for the last research question where the unit of analysis is the state
rather than the institution, a better measure of state wealth may have been GDP. Annual
household income measures the combined gross income of an entire household; however, the
variable is observed through surveys conducted on households. The GDP per capita is observed
via the national accounting system. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis collects and graphs
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data on both median household income in the United States and real gross domestic product
divided by the total population. The graph indicates a growing divergence in the two since 2000
and expanding since 2008 (USBEA, 2020). Therefore, one variable may be better at producing
more appropriate results than the other.
Finally, tax credit receipts may also be high in some high-aid states, or all, because
taxpayers (either unconsciously or consciously) claim tax credits regardless of the illegal
duplication of receiving both a tax-free scholarship and education tax credits. Either not knowing
the action is illegal or believing an IRS audit will never catch the “double-dipper” may be reason
for this duplication. Fortunately, most online tax software products forbid this “double-dipping”.
However, paper filers do not have this restriction enforced. This is a credible limitation to the
study, but there is no way of knowing how many taxpayers take advantage of both incentives
unless a wholesale IRS audit actually took place. Fraud is a major issue in the tax code, and
Future Research
While researching education tax credits and their interaction with large state aid
programs, it became clear that there is no current or historic data source to accurately pinpoint
which higher education sector benefits from education tax credits. As education tax credits are an
indirect source of funding for institutions within a state, no institution specifically asks for this
information. Taxpayers may choose to save their education tax credits or spend them
instantaneously; however, institutions do not have access to identify from what source of income
a parent/student is paying tuition. One could identify key eligibility determinants from the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), which details household income, dependent
status, enrollment type, but this requires access to confidential, individual files. A future research
study - one that could be funded by external grants - could analyze a sample of individual
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FAFSA records to determine eligibility and potential schools applied to. However, this method
has many limitations: the FAFSA cannot accurately identify filers who may claim an education
tax credit; it only can provide potential applicants, which leads to limitations seen in prior
education tax credit analyses. Another less intrusive and less expensive option could be to
analyze the High School Longitudinal Survey of 2009 (HSLS) (IES, 2020). This survey
interviewed approximately 23,000 ninth graders in 2009 and re-interviewed the same cohort in
2012 and again in 2016. From this publicly available dataset, I can collect household income and
what institution a dependent/independent student enrolled in. Once these variables are collected,
I can then match income to AOTC/LLTC eligibility requirements to determine which
institutional sector received the most education tax credits in both 2012 and 2016. This method
still has limitations as I will be predicting tax filer action, but the results will provide
approximate figures.
Identifying which sector receives the most federal dollars via education tax credits is
another assessment strategy for policy effectiveness. As states continue to disinvest in public
institutions, the public sector has little recourse for alternative revenue streams. Increasing
education tax credits to this sector may be beneficial for public sector maintenance. On the other
hand, private nonprofits may rely on their large endowments and higher costs of attendance.
Private for-profits may also rely on increased costs of attendance as well. Due to the 90/10 rule
and predatory veteran enrollment practices, they can rely even more on federal dollars to cover
these costs. This analysis is key in establishing optimal tax policy that benefits both the taxpayers
that directly fund this initiative and the taxpayers that receive tax credits.
An additional topic for further study relating to education tax credits could be identifying
the political motivations of legislators and the beliefs of varied-income taxpayers. This analysis
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could take on a mixed method design with both qualitative in-depth interviews and quantitative
surveying to get at the core reasoning behind education tax policy creation. Is the main intent of
education tax credits to increase enrollment in postsecondary education, alleviate the pangs of
high-tuition for the middle class, or buy votes from those who would benefit most?
Furthermore, the rhetoric of the 2019 Democratic presidential debate included terms such
as “free college”, “increasing the Pell Grant maximum”, and “loan forgiveness”. This rhetoric
implies that higher education issues are prominent as more and more taxpayers realize that a
credential is a necessary requirement for a livable wage. Although free college and a population
free from the bonds of loan debt are a positive step in the right direction, these action plans are
somewhat utopian and unrealistic for the entire population of the U.S. Furthermore, increasing
the Pell Grant so it covers a larger portion of the costs of attendance, will not be sufficient in the
long run if tuition, fees, room, and board continue to escalate. What is more realistic is
maintaining low costs of attendance at public institutions via federal-state partnerships with
maintenance of effort (MoE) requirements. With greater support of increased state appropriations
and an influx of federal dollars, public institutions can be properly subsidized to combat the
market effects of positive externalities associated with education. Also, as public institutions
remain low-cost and academically rigorous with the support of federal-state partnerships, private
non-profits and for-profits will have to lower or sustain current costs of attendance to draw a
sufficient consumer base. The results of this analysis may be a foundation for next steps in this
direction.
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APPENDIX. STATE RANKINGS BASED ON AMOUNT OF GRANT AID

Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

State
California
New York
Texas
Georgia
Virginia
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Tennessee
South
Carolina
Florida
Illinois
Washington
North
Carolina
Indiana
Louisiana
Kentucky
Minnesota
Ohio
Colorado
Missouri
Wisconsin
Arkansas
Michigan
New Mexico
West Virginia
Maryland

Amount in
thousands
2021.328
970.087
939.551
728.853
478.233
435.815
418.493
406.388

Ranking
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

398.28
396.207
347.515
341.578
312.509
303.826
228.082
221.755
196.137
131.684
130.318
129.623
126.619
118.147
108.344
107.43
102.911
100.151

State
Oklahoma
Massachusetts
Alabama
Oregon
Iowa
Nevada
Mississippi
Connecticut
Delaware
Arizona
Vermont
North Dakota
Nebraska
Maine
Kansas
Wyoming
Alaska
Utah
Idaho
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Hawaii
Montana
New
Hampshire

Amount in
thousands
97.968
93.727
82.083
72.139
66.392
42.83
36.246
35.714
25.179
22.568
21.391
20.574
20.417
18.538
17.251
17.033
16.995
14.233
10.104
9.419
5.562
3.285
1.329
0.01

Adapted from “NASSGAP 48th Annual Survey
Report on State-Sponsored Student Financial
Aid,” by NASSGAP, 2017. Copyright 2017 by
NASSGAP.
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